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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the severe constriction of the inequitable
conduct defense to patent infringement accomplished in 2011 by the
issuance of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co. (Therasense) and the enactment of the America Invents
Act (AIA).1 The Article argues that Therasense and the AIA have unduly
narrowed the inequitable conduct doctrine and thus undermined core
functions of United States patent law. Those core functions include: (1)
nurturing and rewarding innovation; (2) encouraging full and early
disclosure of inventions, to promote further innovation and to permit the
public to practice the inventions once the patents expire; (3) avoiding
monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition; and (4) assuring that
ideas in the public domain remain there for free use by the public.2 The
Article concludes that Therasense and specific features of the AIA,
particularly its adoption of new post-issuance review proceedings and a
new best mode amendment, will operate in tandem to sharply curtail the
availability of the inequitable conduct defense and thereby impair the
operation of the U.S. patent system. Simultaneously, Therasense will
unduly limit the opportunity for parties to assert Walker Process antitrust
claims. In short, the cure has been worse than the plague on the patent
system that critics have commonly attributed to the inequitable conduct
doctrine.
I. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT
Inequitable conduct in procuring a patent before the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) is a judicially created defense to patent
infringement that has been described as the “key gatekeeper policing the
1. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (observing that U.S.
patent system seeks to balance promotion of innovation with avoidance of monopolies that
unreasonably suppress competition); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262
(1979) (identifying primary purposes of the federal patent system).
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[U.S.] patent system’s integrity.”3 No federal statute expressly provides for
the defense, although 35 U.S.C. § 282 does mandate the availability of a
defense of unenforceability in any action involving the validity or
infringement of a patent.4 The 1952 Patent Act (the last major revision of
U.S. patent law prior to the AIA)5 and its legislative history are both silent
concerning the grounds and standard of proof for an inequitable conduct
defense.6
Instead, the non-statutory doctrine evolved from the equitable defense
of unclean hands,7 which is based on the equitable maxim that “he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands.”8 The defense of unclean
hands was applied in a trilogy of pre-1950 Supreme Court patent cases —
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maintenance Machinery Co.

3. See Katherine E. White, “There’s a Hole in the Bucket:” The Effective Elimination
of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 716, 717
(2012). Accord Tun-Jen Chiang, The Upside-Down Inequitable Conduct Defense, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. 1243, 1295 (2013) (describing the inequitable conduct defense as “the primary
doctrinal safeguard against patent dishonesty”).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2000). Cf. John M. Golden, Patent Law’s Falstaff: Inequitable
Conduct, the Federal Circuit, and Therasense, 7 WASH. J.L., TECH. & ARTS 353, 356 (2012)
(“Arguably, the defense is implicit in statutory law.”); David Hricik & Seth Trimble,
Congratulations on Your Hallucinations: Why the PTO’s 1992 Amendment to § 1.56 is
Irrelevant to Inequitable Conduct, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (2010) (“[I]n 1952, Congress
codified the defense of inequitable conduct at 35 U.S.C. § 282.”).
5. David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America
Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 519 n.6 (2013) (describing the
development of the 1952 Patent Act).
6. B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement Litigation: A
Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 382 (2008) (“The 1952 Act and its legislative history are both
silent on the issue of the grounds for an ‘inequitable conduct’ defense, much less a
heightened standard of proof for such a defense.”).
7. See Gen. Electro Musical Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1408 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (“‘The concept of inequitable conduct in patent procurement derives from the
equitable doctrine of unclean hands: that a person who obtains a patent by intentionally
misleading the PTO can not [sic] enforce the patent.’”) (quoting Demarco Corp. v. F. Von
Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); Shieldmark, Inc. v.
Creative Safety Supply, LLC, No. 1:12CV221, 2013 WL 123567, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 9,
2013) (same).
8. See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. UCB, Inc., No. 12-60706-CIV, 2013 WL 4811231, at *21
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2013); see also Nordock Inc. v. Sys., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 577, 607 (E.D.
Wis. 2013) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 814 (1945)) (“The defense of unclean hands is based on the equitable maxim that ‘he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands’”). To prove the defense of unclean
hands in patent cases a defendant must show that the patentee “conducted itself as to shock
the moral sensibilities of the judge, or stated otherwise, that the patentee’s conduct was
offensive to the dictates of natural justice.” Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., No. 10CV-2618-H (KSC), 2012 WL 6863471, at *22 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012). Accord Honeywell
Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 398 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (D. Del. 2004)
(outlining the same legal standard for proving unclean hands).
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(Precision),9 Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.,10 and Keystone
Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.11 — involving clear-cut scenarios of
perjury, the manufacture of false evidence, and the suppression of
evidence. The doctrine of inequitable conduct was first clearly articulated
by the Supreme Court in Precision, which held that courts could dismiss
patent infringement suits based on inequitable conduct committed during
the patent’s prosecution.12
The Supreme Court in Precision and the Federal Circuit in Therasense
confirmed that the inequitable conduct doctrine serves multiple important
policy objectives, and scholars are in accord. These objectives include
protecting the integrity of the patent system by ensuring applicant candor,
encouraging patent applicants to internalize costs of the patent system,
avoiding patent monopolies that stem from inequitable conduct, and
punishing patentees who behave inequitably toward the public during the
patent acquisition process.13
A. Elements of the Inequitable Conduct Defense
Traditional inequitable conduct analysis in patent cases involves two
elements. The accused patent infringer must show by clear and convincing
evidence that: (1) an individual associated with the filing and prosecution
of a patent application made an affirmative misrepresentation of a material
fact, failed to disclose material information, or submitted false material
information to the PTO; and (2) did so with the intent to deceive the PTO.14
If both requirements are met, the trial judge has the discretion to declare the
subject patent unenforceable. An unenforceable patent is effectively
useless to the patentee. As courts have recognized, “because only the
9. 324 U.S. 806 (1945) (finding unclean hands where patentee suppressed evidence of
perjury before the PTO and attempted to enforce perjury-tainted patent).
10. 322 U.S. 238 (1944) (finding unclean hands where patentee manufactured false
article in support of its patent application and later suppressed the article), overruled on
other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976).
11. 290 U.S. 244 (1933) (finding unclean hands where patentee submitted false
affidavit to PTO to overcome a prior use).
12. 324 U.S. at 819 (concluding that “inequitable conduct impregnated Automotive’s
entire cause of action and justified dismissal”).
13. See id. at 816 (noting that the public maintains “a paramount interest in seeing that
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct”);
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (noting that “[a]s an equitable doctrine, inequitable conduct hinges on basic
fairness”); Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and
Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2011)
(discussing the punishment function of inequitable conduct doctrine).
14. Astrazeneca Pharms. LP v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 770 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)).
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patent holder possesses the right to enforce a patent against infringement,15
the inequitable conduct doctrine operates solely against the patent
holder.”16
The defense of inequitable conduct is wholly equitable in character
and therefore a matter for the court to decide.17 The courts are “not bound
by the definition of materiality in PTO rules.”18 Nevertheless, prior to
Therasense, the Federal Circuit commonly followed PTO Rule 5619—
which was originally adopted as part of the Rules of Practice in 1949 and
then substantially reformulated in 1977 and 1992 — in determining
whether information was material.20 Rule 56 imposes on each individual
associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application a duty of
candor to the PTO, including a duty to disclose to the PTO all information
known to that individual to be material to patentability.21
While courts commonly followed Rule 56, five different standards of
materiality emerged22 and the judiciary vacillated on which standard to
use.23 As noted in Therasense, the proliferation of materiality standards
produced ambiguity and contradiction in the development of the doctrine of
inequitable conduct.24 But in recent years, the choice of standards often
narrowed to those reflected in the 1977 and 1992 amendments. The
15. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006).
16. Shieldmark, Inc. v. Creative Safety Supply, LLC, No. 1:12CV221, 2013 WL
123567, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2013).
17. PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“The defense of inequitable conduct is entirely equitable in nature, and thus not
an issue for a jury to decide.”); ABT Sys., LLC v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 4:11CV00374
AGF, 2013 WL 425399, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 4, 2013) (citing PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc.
v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
18. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294; CoStar Realty Information, Inc. v. CIVIX-DDI,
LLC, Nos. 12 C 4968, 12 C 7091, 12 C 8632, 2013 WL 2151548, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 15,
2013) (citing to Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294).
19. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2013).
20. See Avid Ident. Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“In evaluating materiality, this court typically refers to the definition provided in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56, by which the PTO promulgated the duty of disclosure.”).
21. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2013). This duty applies to (1) each named inventor, (2) each
attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application, and (3) to anyone who is
substantively involved in the patent prosecution. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (2013); Avid Ident.
Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Import Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2010). A person is
substantively involved if the involvement relates to the content of the application or
decisions related thereto and is not wholly administrative or secretarial in nature. Id. at 974.
22. See Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 744 (2011) (describing the five different standards for
defining materiality); White, supra note 3, at 724-25.
23. See generally Hricik & Trimble, supra note 4, at 3 (providing an overview of the
development of different standards for determining materiality)
24. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
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remaining three standards were reflected in case law developed before the
Federal Circuit, the near-exclusive appellate court for patent cases,25 was
formed in 1982, primarily to instill uniformity in patent law and permit
more expert review of patent appeals by a specialized court.26
Rule 56 as originally adopted prohibited fraud but said nothing about
inequitable conduct. The original version, adopted in 1949 (several years
after the Supreme Court decided Precision), stated that “any application
fraudulently filed or in connection with which any fraud is practiced or
attempted on the Patent Office, may be stricken from the files.”27 The
definition of fraud in this context was unclear.28
The 1977 amendment transformed Rule 56 from a provision enabling
the PTO to strike applications for fraud to one that formally established a
duty of candor and good faith by patent applicants and their attorneys to
disclose information they were aware of that was material to the
examination of the application.
The 1977 amendment adopted a
“reasonable examiner” standard by defining information as “material” if
there was a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would
consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue
as a patent.29 In making this change the PTO stated that the amendment
“codifie[d] the existing Office policy on fraud and inequitable conduct,
which is believed consistent with the prevailing case law in the federal
courts.”30 In the ensuing years the Federal Circuit regularly referred to this
standard as the one to use in cases raising claims of inequitable conduct.31
Pursuant to the 1977 amendment, a false statement or nondisclosure could
be material for purposes of an inequitable conduct determination even if the
invention in question would otherwise be patentable.32
25. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437,
1453 (2012).
26. David Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards: Competing Notions of
Inconsistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 ALA. L. REV. 647, 681 (2013) (inferring from
legislative history that Congress hoped for a consolidation of all patent appeals in one circuit
court in order to promote standardization and expertise); James R. Barney, A Guide to
Appealing Patent Cases to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2013 WL
574526, at *11 (Aspatore, 2013) (noting that the Federal Circuit was created to realize
uniformity in patent law). But cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal
Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1802 (2013) (“It is not clear whether the Federal
Circuit has brought uniformity, quality, or efficiency to patent law.”).
27. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1949).
28. Dashiell Milliman-Jarvis, The State of Ethical Duties After Therasense, 25 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 695, 699 (2012) (observing that the definition of “fraud” in this context was
largely unknown).
29. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977).
30. Duty of Disclosure, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977).
31. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (applying the “reasonable examiner” standard to determine inequitable conduct).
32. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
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The PTO amended Rule 56 in 1992 in response to criticism that the
reasonable examiner standard was vague and unrelated to any concept
applied in other areas of patent law.33 The 1992 amendment continued to
impose a duty to disclose material information, but it provided a more
refined definition of materiality. The amended Rule 56, which remained in
effect at least until 2014, imposes a duty on individuals34 associated with
the filing and prosecution of an application to disclose to the PTO all
information known to be material to patentability as defined in the rule.
Information is material when
it is not cumulative to information already of record or made of
record in the application and (1) [i]t establishes, by itself or in
combination with other information, a prima facie case of
unpatentability of a claim; or (2) it refutes, or is inconsistent with,
a position the applicant takes in: (i) [o]pposing an argument of
unpatentability relied upon by the [PTO], or (ii) [a]sserting an
argument of patentability.35
When it adopted the 1992 amendment, the PTO considered and
rejected the adoption of a but-for test of materiality. It did so because it
concluded that use of such a narrow standard would not enable the PTO to
obtain the information it required to properly evaluate patentability.36 Rule
56’s materiality standard, as adopted in 1977 and refined in 1992, was also
consistent with the materiality standard applied in a range of analogous
contexts. As the Therasense dissent noted,37 the use of a but-for standard
has been rejected in the context of, inter alia, fraudulent registration of
copyrights and trademarks,38 proxy solicitations regulated under section
2006) (noting that a misstatement or omission can be material notwithstanding a
determination that the invention is unpatentable).
33. Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct in Patent
Procurement: A Nutshell, a Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for Modest
Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 296 (1997) (detailing what the
changed reasonable examiner standard entails).
34. Only individuals owe a duty of candor to the PTO under Rule 56. Corporations do
not. Avid Ident. Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 974 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(explaining that only a breach of the duty of candor to the PTO by an individual may give
rise to a finding of inequitable conduct); see also Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech. Co., No. 2:12cv-00053-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 876036, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2013) (discussing which
specific party failed to disclose material prior art and holding that defendants’ failure to
name a specific individual in a general counterclaim alleging that “Applicants . . . did not
comply with their duty of disclosure” should result in dismissal of the claim).
35. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2012).
36. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1310-14 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Bryson, J., dissenting) (explaining why Rule 56 clearly extends beyond the but-for
standard).
37. Id. at 1315-16 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (listing situations where the but-for test was
rejected).
38. Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Only the
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14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,39 criminal prosecutions under
the federal mail and fraud statutes,40 and the element of materiality in
common law fraud.41
The amended Rule 56, consistent with the 1949 and 1977 versions,
continued to omit use of the term “inequitable conduct.” The PTO has
justified this continuing omission on the ground that inequitable conduct
encompasses too expansive a range of conduct to be subject to mandatory
striking.42 The 1992 version of Rule 56 was never fully embraced by
federal courts,43 and until Therasense was decided, the Federal Circuit
continued to cite the reasonable examiner standard for materiality that was
set forth in the 1977 version.44 Indeed, some post-Therasense federal
‘knowing failure to advise the Copyright Office of facts which might have occasioned a
rejection of the application constitute[s] reason for holding the registration invalid and thus
incapable of supporting an infringement action . . . or denying enforcement on the ground of
unclean hands . . . .’”) (internal quotation omitted); see also generally 2 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.20[B][1] at 7-212, 4(1) & n.21 (rev.
ed. 2010).
39. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (rejecting a standard
that would require a showing that a voter would have changed his vote but for a
misstatement or omission in proxy materials and instead adopting a standard requiring the
injured party to show that the misstatement or omission was material, i.e., that “there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote”).
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006). As the dissent noted, when a charge of mail or
wire fraud is based on the nondisclosure of material information in violation of a duty to
disclose, proof of materiality does not require a showing of actual reliance on the part of the
victim. All that is required is proof that the nondisclosure or concealment was capable of
influencing the intended victim. 649 F.3d at 1315 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (citing Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999)).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977) (stating that not all fraudulent
misrepresentations are material).
42. Sean M. O’Connor, Defusing the “Atomic Bomb” of Patent Litigation: Avoiding
and Defending Against Allegations of Inequitable Conduct After McKesson et al., 9 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 330, 349 (2010).
43. See George G. Gordon & Stephen A. Stack, Aligning Antitrust and Patent Law:
Side Effects from the Federal Circuit’s Cure for the Inequitable Conduct “Plague” in
Therasense, 26 ANTITRUST 88, 89 (2011) (observing that before Therasense, the Federal
Circuit’s interpretation of the elements of inequitable conduct contrasted with the
interpretation by the PTO under Rule 56). In Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine
Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the Federal Circuit reasoned that the 1992
version of Rule 56 was “not intended to replace or supplant the ‘reasonable examiner’
standard.”
44. See, e.g., Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1373-74
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (determining the materiality of information by whether the reasonable
examiner considers it important for issuing the patent); Avid Ident. Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp.
Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Information is material where a reasonable
examiner would find it important to a determination of patentability.”); Astrazeneca Pharm.
LP v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing the reasonable
examiner standard as the most often-employed standard for establishing materiality).
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courts continued to cite the reasonable examiner standard.45
The other element of inequitable conduct is intent. In Precision, the
Supreme Court’s only major discussion of inequitable conduct, the Court
failed to delineate the requisite level of intent, although it did refer to, inter
alia, willful conduct.46 The requisite level of intent has varied considerably
since Precision, ranging on the spectrum from negligence to gross
negligence to recklessness to specific intent.47 Because direct evidence of
intent to deceive is rare,48 a finding of intent pre-Therasense was often
based on the totality of the circumstances, including circumstantial
evidence.49
B. Effects of the Inequitable Conduct Defense
The inequitable conduct defense has been described as a “critical part
of the complicated system of checks and balances that constitutes U.S.
patent law.”50 Specifically, the defense can help correct for: (1) the PTO’s
limited ability to carefully review all material potentially relevant to
patentability; (2) the strong incentive for deception provided by an issued
patent’s presumption of validity in litigation; and (3) the absence of
procedures to challenge the validity of patent rights that are as robust as
those found in Japan and the European Union.51 The defense is especially
45. See, e.g., Seiko Epson Corp. v. E-Babylon, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-896-BR, 2011 WL
5554447, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 15, 2011) (holding that a material reference is one that a
reasonable examiner would consider important in considering the patent application).
46. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15
(1945) (explaining what is required of the nature of misconduct to be punished as a crime or
to justify legal proceedings).
47. See generally Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in
Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37 (1993) (tracing the development of inequitable
conduct and the requisite level of intent); Thomas L. Irving, Lauren L. Stevens, Scott M.K.
Lee & Alexis N. Simpson, The Evolution of Intent: A Review of Patent Law Cases Invoking
the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct from Precision to Exergen, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 303
(2010) (addressing the unpredictability of inequitable conduct in patent law).
48. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Ltd., No. 3:10-CV-276-F, 2013 WL
2338345, at *36 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2013).
49. See Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (noting that in inequitable conduct cases, intent “must generally be inferred from
the facts and circumstances surrounding the applicant’s overall conduct”); Dorothy Auth &
Jason M. Rockman, Federal Circuit Considers ‘Inequitable Conduct’ En Banc, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 16, 2010, at 1 (“Because direct evidence of an intent to deceive is rare, ‘intent to
deceive’ is often based on the totality of the circumstances, including circumstantial
evidence.”).
50. Golden, supra note 4, at 359.
51. Id. at 359-60. Accord Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of
Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS
24,
30
(2011),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/rantanenpetherbridge.pdf (describing the
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important because patent prosecution in the U.S. is generally ex parte.52
But the defense has an army of critics. One scholar has concluded that
the inequitable conduct doctrine “attracts more passionate loathing, and
stronger criticism, than any other doctrine in patent law.”53 The inequitable
conduct defense has frequently been referred to as the “atomic bomb” of
patent law54 because its success renders the entire patent permanently
unenforceable, even if the undisclosed information was material to only a
single claim,55 and may also render related patents unenforceable.56
Inequitable conduct may also generate claims under the antitrust and
securities laws,57 taking the form of counterclaims or ensuing cases, such as
antitrust class actions brought by private parties.58 The defense, insofar as
it focuses on the moral turpitude of the patentee, can have negative
reputational consequences for the prosecuting attorney and thereby may
deter settlements.59 In other cases, assertion of the defense can multiply the
cost of litigation,60 particularly by expanding discovery, and thereby have a

inequitable conduct defense as “[t]he clearest tool of pre-[AIA] patent law to discourage”
nondisclosure of relevant information to the PTO).
52. Brett Ira Johnson, The Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation: Where
We Are, Where We Have Been, and Where We Should Go from Here, 28 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 234 (2012) (describing patent prosecutions as ex parte
proceedings).
53. Chiang, supra note 3, at 1244.
54. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d
1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (Rader, J., dissenting).
55. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (en banc) (“When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred in
relation to one or more claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent
is rendered unenforceable.”).
56. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (“[T]he taint of a finding of inequitable conduct
can spread from a single patent to render unenforceable other related patents and
applications in the same technology family.”); Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Pres. Sys., Inc.,
922 F.2d 801, 803-04 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that inequitable conduct “may render
unenforceable all claims which eventually issue from the same or a related application”).
57. Lawrence T. Kass & Nathaniel T. Browand, ‘Therasense’: Vaccine for a Plague,
NAT’L L.J., June 6, 2011, at 38 (discussing the requisite proof to render a patent
unenforceable for inequitable conduct).
58. Gordon & Stack, supra note 43, at 91 (discussing collateral effects of inequitable
conduct defenses in patent cases).
59. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288; Ian G. McFarland, Comment, In the Wake of
Therasense & Nisus Corp., How Can Patent Attorneys Defend Themselves Against
Allegations of Inequitable Conduct?, 78 TENN. L. REV. 487, 499 (2011) (observing that
patent attorneys who are the subject of inequitable conduct findings confront both the threat
of formal discipline from the PTO and public ridicule).
60. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 740 (2009) (noting that “litigation of inequitable
conduct claims is particularly costly”).
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coercive effect on settlements.61
The draconian nature of the defense, in combination with its preTherasense low threshold of proof, makes it appealing to accused patent
infringers. One study, prepared by a committee of the American
Intellectual Property Law Association and cited by Therasense,62 estimated
that eighty percent of patent infringement suits contain an allegation of
inequitable conduct.63 But this study contained no data or other evidence to
support its estimate,64 and other accounts of the frequency with which the
defense is asserted are considerably lower — ranging from less than twenty
percent65 to approximately twenty-five percent66 to sixteen to thirty-five
percent67 to forty percent.68 Moreover, appeals involving inequitable
61. In a survey by the American Bar Association, 69.4% of approximately 3,300
responding attorneys agreed or strongly agreed that discovery is commonly used as a tool to
force settlement in civil litigation. See Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Litig., Member Survey on
Civil
Practice:
Full
Report
69
(Dec.
11,
2009),
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/survey/docs/report-aba-report.pdf (presenting empirical
evidence on the beliefs of lawyers on the current system of civil litigation). In a separate
survey, 71% of approximately 1,400 responding Fellows of the American College of Trial
Lawyers agreed that discovery is used as a tool to force settlement. Am. College of Trial
Lawyers & Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Final Report on the Joint
Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Institute
for the Advancement of the American Legal System 9 (rev. ed. Apr. 15, 2009),
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cf
m&ContentID=4008.
62. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288.
63. Committee Position Paper: The Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct and the Duty of
Candor in Patent Procurement: Its Current Adverse Impact on the Operation of the United
States Patent System, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 74 (1988) (position paper on inequitable conduct and
duty of candor).
64. Jason Rantanen, Recalibrating Our Empirical Understanding of Inequitable
Conduct,
3
IP
THEORY
98,
99
(2013),
available
at
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ipt/vol3/iss2/3/ (commenting on the absence of
empirical evidence on rate of inequitable conduct pleadings).
65. Benjamin Brown, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: A Standard in Motion, 19
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 608 (2009) (providing statistical analysis
and analyzing possible consequences of reforming the defense through legislation).
66. Cotropia, supra note 60, at 739 (providing a comprehensive, theoretical analysis on
the inequitable conduct doctrine).
67. Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality:
Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 155-56 & tbl.1 (2006) (noting that
the inequitable conduct defense is adjudicated in 16-35% of all patent infringement cases
that proceed to trial).
68. Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1358-60 (2009) (noting that between
2000 and 2008, inequitable conduct pleadings at the district court level increased from four
to forty percent). This study, representing perhaps the sole empirical data supporting the
claim that there has been a dramatic increase in pleadings of inequitable conduct, has been
criticized. See, e.g., Rantanen, supra note 64, at 100, 103-05 (citing two significant
limitations of Mammen’s research).
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conduct are infrequent. One survey found that the annual number of cases
appealed on inequitable conduct rose from thirteen to thirty between 2004
and 2007, and then declined to twenty-six in 2008.69 Inequitable conduct is
rarely a successful defense,70 but the common perception that the doctrine
is asserted to excess in patent litigation is “empirically unverified.”71
Patent applicants often attempt to negate the defense by providing the
PTO with voluminous prior art72 references—many of which are
inconsequential or unavailing73—and concurrent patent applications for the
same technology in other countries.74 This purported deluge may have
69. See The Honorable Randall R. Rader, Always at the Margin: Inequitable Conduct
in Flux, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 777, 779 (2010) (presenting data on the number of cases
appealed on inequitable conduct). The number of cases appealed on inequitable conduct has
not kept pace with the number of new patent lawsuits, which has continued to rise in recent
years. For example, the total number of new patent lawsuits jumped twenty-two percent in
2011, totaling more than four thousand new cases. Robert Harkins, How the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (AIA) is Changing Patent Protection and Litigation, ASPATORE, 2013
WL 571334, at *1 (Jan. 2013) (detailing how the AIA might cause companies to pursue
different strategies in pursuing patents and engaging in patent litigation).
70. See Petherbridge, Rantanen & Mojibi, supra note 13, at 1340 (reporting that the
Federal Circuit reached an ultimate conclusion that inequitable conduct was committed
approximately 2.5 times a year during the period 1983-2010); Mammen, supra note 68, at
1358-60 (concluding that during the period 1983-2008 an inequitable conduct defense
succeeded on appeal to the Federal Circuit no more than five times a year); LEX MACHINA,
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSE IN PATENT LITIGATION: 2005-2010 (Jan. 5, 2011),
https://lexmachina.com/files/Inequitable%20Conduct%20Study.pdf (reporting 41 instances
of inequitable conduct findings by federal courts in 13,786 total patent infringement cases
during the period January 2005-May 2010); Steve Carlson, Changes in the Law of
Inequitable Conduct: New Pleading and Proof Standards 5 (May 10, 2012), available at
http://www.fr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/6%20-%20Changes%20in%20the%20Law
%20of%20Inequitable%20Conduct%20-%20Carlson.pdf (noting that inequitable conduct is
“[p]led routinely, tried frequently, and occasionally won”). In the vast majority of cases
where the defense succeeds, the patent is also invalidated. Melissa Feeney Wasserman,
Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 23 (2008).
71. Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & R. Polk Wagner, Unenforceability 26 (Feb.
21, 2013), Univ. of Penn. Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-28; Univ. of
Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 12-15; Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 12-10; Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2012-28; available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167417 (evaluating the impact of the
inequitable conduct doctrine).
72. “Prior art” refers to preexisting knowledge and technology already available to the
public. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (defining the documents and activities that can
function as prior art); Kimberley-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing the competing views of the definition of prior art and
concluding that the hypothetical person standard was correct).
73. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc); Robert C. Scheinfeld & Parker H. Bagley, Inequitable Conductors: All Aboard
the ‘Therasense’ Train, N.Y.L.J., July 27, 2011, at 3.
74. Sheri Qualters, ‘Therasense’ a Strong Candidate for High Court Review, Patent
Lawyers Say; Decision Raising the Bar for Inequitable Conduct Defense Departs from
Position of PTO, DOJ, NAT’L L.J., May 26, 2011. Some portion of this deluge may be
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contributed to the PTO’s backlog of pending patent applications.
Approximately 500,000 patent applications are filed every year with the
PTO,75 and in September 2012 approximately 608,000 applications were
awaiting their first action.76 This backlog shows few signs of abating. The
average pendency of U.S. patent applications exceeded three years each
year during the period from 2009 to 2013.77
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the oft-criticized deluge of prior art
references is suspect for multiple reasons. First, there is remarkably little
empirical evidence supporting the rote argument—highly persuasive to the
Therasense majority78—that a deluge has occurred.79 What evidence does
exist tends to rebut the point by demonstrating that a small sliver of patents
accounts for the bulk of voluminous prior art references. In 2012, the
average patent cited forty-three references and only eight percent of patents
cited more than one hundred references.80 The median submission was a
mere eight references81 and more than two-thirds of the seven million prior
attributable to efforts by patent applicants to “bury” examiners with hundreds of references
so as to distract them from highly relevant references. Such efforts, even if they do take
place, probably do not constitute inequitable conduct. See, e.g., Seaboard Int’l, Inc. v.
Cameron Int’l Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00281-MLH-SKO, 2013 WL 3936889, at *6 (E.D. Cal.
July 30, 2013) (agreeing with plaintiff’s argument and several federal cases that concealing
material information in extensive extraneous citations to the PTO is not, by itself, enough to
show inequitable conduct); ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1314,
1318 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (noting that specific intent to deceive was not the single most
reasonable inference capable of being drawn when Parkervision provided voluminous prior
art references, since it was equally likely, if not more likely, that it did so to insulate itself
from claims of inequitable conduct for under-disclosure). But cf. CoStar Realty
Information, Inc. v. CIVIX-DDI, LLC, Nos. 12 C 4968, 12 C 7091, 12 C 8632, 2013 WL
2151548, at *12 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2013) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has not established
definitively whether or under what circumstances burying may constitute inequitable
conduct.”).
75. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 746
(2012).
76. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT
FISCAL
YEAR
2012
25
(Nov.
7,
2012),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2012PAR.pdf.
This number was
significantly lower than the backlog of approximately 750,000 applications in 2008. Id.
77. Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Average Pendency of US Patent Applications,
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 20, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/averagependency-of-us-patent-applications.html.
78. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
79. Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton Dickinson: A First
Impression, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 226, 257-58 (2012).
80. Dennis Crouch, Citing Patent References, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 10, 2013, 7:24 AM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/01/citingreferences.html.
81. Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Citing References at the PTO, PATENTLY-O
(Oct. 23, 2012, 8:05 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/citing-references-atthe-pto.html.
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art citations in the data set were associated with just ten percent of the
patents.82 Moreover, there is no significant upward trend in recent years.
During the period from 2005 to 2011, the median number of references
increased from thirteen to just seventeen.83 In any event, it is unclear that
the inequitable conduct defense is responsible for the submission of
numerous prior art references. There are many other factors that provide
incentives to patent applicants to submit references to the PTO. For
example, “such submissions bolster a patent against post-issuance
challenges at the Patent Office and strengthen the presumption of validity
that attaches to an issued patent.”84
Second, recent empirical research indicates that historically the
inequitable conduct defense has worked in practice as it is supposed to
work in theory. Those “patents found unenforceable have statistically
significantly fewer citations to prior art than patents in other similarly
tested groups.”85 As Professors Petherbridge, Rantanen and Wagner have
noted, “[t]he doctrine seems to be working as expected . . . . [E]liminating
the doctrine of inequitable conduct may be a mistake.”86 Third, while patent
“examiners are required to consider all prior art references,”87 evidence
suggests that examiners use the results of their own prior art searches,
rather than the purportedly voluminous references provided by applicants.88
Such evidence weakens the link between preemption of the inequitable
conduct defense and delay at the PTO.
In short, the negative and unintended consequences of the inequitable
conduct doctrine have been exaggerated—perhaps significantly so. But a
dearth of damning empirical evidence has not discouraged critics from
82. Id.
83. Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Average Number of References Cited Per
Patent,
PATENTLY-O
(July
22,
2011,
9:03
AM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/07/average-number-of-references-cited-perpatent.html. But cf. Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, References Cited Per Patent,
PATENTLY-O (Jan. 24, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/references-citedpatent.html (“Over the past 13 years the number of references cited per patent has grown
dramatically.”).
84. Arpita Bhattacharyya & Michael R. McGurk, IDS Practice After Therasense and
the AIA: Decoupling the Link Between Information Disclosure and Inequitable Conduct, 29
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 605, 611 (2013).
85. Petherbridge, Rantanen & Wagner, supra note 71, at 22.
86. Id. at 25.
87. TouchTunes Music Corp. v. Rowe Int’l Corp., 847 F. Supp. 2d 606, 623 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
88. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Patent
Applicant Citations Matter?, 42 RESEARCH POLICY 844, 844 (2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656568 (concluding that patent
examiners rely almost exclusively on prior art they find themselves); Robert Brendan
Taylor, Burying, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 99, 115-16 (2012) (citing a study
that found PTO examiners often use their own prior art searches to make their decisions).
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frequently describing the doctrine as an absolute plague on the courts and
the United States patent system.89
To date the plague has not moved the Supreme Court, which has
provided no guidance concerning inequitable conduct since it issued its
opinion in Precision almost seventy years ago. The lower courts have
grappled with the contours of the defense in this vacuum. Therasense
represented the Federal Circuit’s second attempt in two decades to reduce
inequitable conduct claims in patent cases. The court’s prior attempt to
reduce inequitable conduct claims occurred in Kingsdown Medical
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc.90 In that case, the court did not address
materiality, but it overturned precedent91 which held that a showing of
gross negligence was sufficient to establish the intent prong of the defense.
Kingsdown held that the patentee’s conduct must indicate sufficient
culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.92 In subsequent years,
however, Federal Circuit panels routinely ignored the case93 and the
requisite culpability was watered down to a “should have known” standard,
which was perhaps a lower standard than gross negligence.94
Until Therasense, some courts also employed a sliding scale approach
to materiality and intent that allowed a lesser showing of either element
based on a stronger showing of the other.95 In theory, use of a sliding scale
was restricted to situations in which there was clear and convincing proof
of both materiality and intent. But in practice, use of the scale sometimes
produced findings of inequitable conduct with essentially no independent
support for a finding of intent.96 As noted by the Federal Circuit, use of a
89. See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876
n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418,
1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major
patent case has become an absolute plague.”).
90. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d 867.
91. See Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the intent to
deceive prong of a claim of inequitable conduct may be satisfied by a showing of gross
negligence; this ruling was subsequently overturned in Kingsdown).
92. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
93. Zhe (Amy) Peng, Stacy Lewis, Deborah Herzfeld, Jill McAlpine & Tom Irving, A
Panacea for Inequitable Conduct Problems or Kingsdown Version 2.0? The Therasense
Decision and a Look into the Future of U.S. Patent Law Reform, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 373,
390 (2011) [hereinafter Panacea].
94. See Bhattacharyya & McGurk, supra note 84, at 614 (stating that the “should have
known” standard is lower than the “gross negligence” standard).
95. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226,
1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen balanced against high materiality, the showing of intent
can be proportionately less.”); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d
1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that issues of materiality and culpability are often
related and intertwined); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 716 (1st Cir.
1981) (same).
96. Kass & Browand, supra note 57. See also Jeffrey J. Oelke, Inequitable Conduct,
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sliding scale “conflated, and diluted, the standards for both intent and
materiality.”97 The foregoing factors prompted the Federal Circuit to
consider Therasense en banc.
II. THERASENSE
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Therasense imposed significant
limitations on potential use of the inequitable conduct defense. These
limitations included, but were not restricted to, the adoption of elevated
standards for intent and materiality.
A. Procedural History of Therasense
Therasense owned U.S. Patent No. 5,820,551 (the ‘551 patent), which
involves disposable blood-glucose test strips for diabetes management.98
Therasense had prosecuted the original application for the patent for more
than thirteen years, beginning in 1984, during which time it was repeatedly
rejected over U.S. patent No. 4,454,382 (the ‘382 patent), also owned by
Therasense.99 Following amendment of the claim, the examiner finally
allowed the ‘551 patent to issue.100 In March 2004, Therasense sued
several defendants, including Becton, Dickinson & Company, alleging
infringement of the ‘551 patent, in response to Becton’s declaratory
judgment action asking for recognition that its own patents did not infringe
the ‘551 patent.101 Following trial, the federal district court held that the
‘551 patent was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct because
Therasense did not disclose to the PTO allegedly inconsistent statements
that had previously been made to the European Patent Office regarding the
European counterpart to the ‘382 patent.102
Therasense appealed to the Federal Circuit, where a three-judge panel
affirmed the holding of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct.103
Willful Infringement, and Antitrust Law: Navigating New Challenges in Patent Litigation,
2012 WL 6636454, at *4, ASPATORE (Nov. 2012) (attributing adoption of sliding scale in
part to “the fact that direct evidence that a patentee intended to deceive the PTO is rarely
available”).
97. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
98. Id. at 1282.
99. Id. at 1283.
100. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093-94
(N.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
101. 649 F.3d at 1284.
102. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1114-25 (N.D.
Cal. 2008), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
103. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
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Therasense then successfully petitioned for rehearing en banc. Eleven
judges participated in the decision, which was six–one–four (four
dissenting votes and one concurrence). The majority opinion, which
vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings,104 noted that
the court granted en banc review because it recognized the problems
created by the expansion and overuse of the inequitable conduct doctrine.105
B. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion highlighted four key points. First, to prevail on
its inequitable conduct defense, an accused infringer must show by clear
and convincing evidence a specific intent to deceive, which requires proof
that the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and
made a deliberate decision to withhold it.106 There is no requirement that
intent be shown by direct evidence,107 but in the absence of such direct
evidence a “specific intent to deceive must be ‘the single most reasonable
inference able to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’”108 This
holding has elevated the importance of witness credibility in assessing
allegations of inequitable conduct.109 The intent requirement is not satisfied
by a finding that a misrepresentation or omission constitutes negligence or
even gross negligence.110 All eleven judges agreed on this last point.
Second, as a general rule, the materiality required to establish
2010), vacated, 374 Fed. App’x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
104. The outcome of the further proceeding is reflected in the district court decision in
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Cal. 2012). In that
decision, the court again held that the ‘551 patent was unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct. Id. at 869.
105. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1285.
106. Id. at 1290.
107. See Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. 06cv2433 DMS (KSC), 2012
WL 1328640, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2012) (“[T]here is no requirement that intent be
shown by direct evidence. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly recognized that
‘deceptive intent can be inferred from indirect and circumstantial evidence.’”) (quoting
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289).
108. Am. Calcar, 2012 WL 1328640, at *7 (quoting Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290-91).
Accord In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
109. See Sanya Sukduang & Courtney B. Casp, Assessing Materiality and Intent in a
Post-Therasense World, BNA’S PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL, Feb. 15,
2013,
available
at
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=b2937063-d5a1-42b2ba52-db47a5d35d32 (discussing the importance of witness credibility in establishing intent).
110. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. Accord Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel
Caddy, Inc., 695 F.3d 1285, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (underscoring that negligence alone
cannot establish intent); 1st Media, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 694 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is not enough to argue carelessness, lack of attention, poor docketing or
cross-referencing, or anything else that might be considered negligent or even grossly
negligent.”).
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inequitable conduct is “but-for” materiality.111 In making this materiality
determination, courts must “apply the preponderance of evidence standard
and give claims their broadest reasonable construction.”112 An undisclosed
reference is material “if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it
been aware of the undisclosed prior art.”113 A defendant must show that it
is more likely than not that one or more claims of the asserted patent would
have been anticipated or rendered obvious if the patent examiner had been
aware of the undisclosed reference.
This new but-for standard set a higher bar for establishing materiality
than the PTO’s own definition under Rule 56.114 Indeed, as the Federal
Circuit noted in Therasense, it specifically “decline[d] to adopt the current
version of Rule 56 in defining inequitable conduct because reliance on this
standard has resulted in the very problems this court sought to address by
taking the case en banc.”115 Only six of the eleven judges coalesced behind
this new but-for standard. The Federal Circuit noted that materiality is
often congruent with a validity determination – if a claim is invalidated
based on prior art that was intentionally withheld, then that reference is
necessarily material. This is because a finding of invalidity requires clear
and convincing evidence, a more onerous evidentiary burden than that used
in patent prosecution at the PTO.116 Post-Therasense, the Federal Circuit
111. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
112. Id. at 1291-92. Accord Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting the standard for establishing but-for materiality set forth in
Therasense); Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Raritan Americas, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 229, 243
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting the standard for establishing but-for materiality set forth in
Therasense); Morningware, Inc. v. Hearthware Home Prods., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 1018,
1042 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“[T]he standard for establishing but-for materiality in the inequitable
conduct context only requires a preponderance of the evidence. . . .”); Ohio Willow Wood
Co. v. ALPS South, LLC, No. 2:04-cv-1223, 2012 WL 3283437, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10,
2012) (“Unlike the burden of proof in the intent prong, the materiality prong carries a
preponderance of the evidence standard when assessing the ‘but-for’ materiality of a
withheld reference.”). But cf. Everlight Elecs. Co. v. Nichia Corp., No. 12-cv-11758, 2013
WL 1821512, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2013) (“Both elements – intent and materiality –
must be established by clear and convincing evidence . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
113. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291. Accord Aventis, 675 F.3d at 1334 (quoting
Therasense in describing the test for but-for materiality); ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm,
Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (quoting the test for but-for materiality
stated in Therasense).
114. The Federal Circuit was not bound by the definition of materiality set forth in Rule
56. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293-94 (citing Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 154950 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The PTO has no rulemaking authority over the substantive questions
that it addresses. Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the Federal Circuit?, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE
335, 336-37 (Dec. 20, 2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocketpart/intellectual-property/who%E2%80%99s-afraid-of-the-federal-circuit?/
(citing
Therasense).
115. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294.
116. Id. at 1292 (discussing patent invalidation in the district court).
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has reinforced the idea that but-for materiality is intertwined with
invalidity. A finding of invalidity based on withheld references renders
them material117 and conversely a finding of validity ordinarily precludes a
finding of materiality.118
Third, there is an exception to but-for materiality in “cases of
affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an
unmistakably false affidavit.”119 In these cases the misconduct is material
regardless of the effect it had had on the PTO. It is effectively per se
material,120 possibly regardless of the triviality of the misrepresentation.121
The Therasense majority noted that this exception to the but-for
requirement is consistent with the Supreme Court’s early trio of unclean
hands cases (Precision, Hazel-Atlas, and Keystone).122
Fourth, intent and materiality are distinct requirements and district
courts should not use a sliding scale to determine the existence of
inequitable conduct. Instead, courts should assess the evidence of
materiality independent of their analysis of intent.123 All eleven judges also
agreed on this fourth point.124
Therasense also reaffirmed that a district court’s factual findings
117. See, e.g., Aventis, 675 F.3d at 1334 (holding that but-for materiality was
established because the two references withheld from the PTO were also used to invalidate
the claims at issue).
118. See, e.g., Triangle Software, LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1457, 2012
WL 527223, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2012) (holding that, after a bifurcated trial, withheld
prior art could not be material because the jury determined that the same reference did not
invalidate the patent). Accord Casp & Sukduang, supra note 109 (stating that the analyses
of materiality and validity are intertwined).
119. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292.
120. See Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc., 695 F.3d 1285, 1294
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In other words, a false affidavit or declaration is per se material.”); In re
Method of Processing Ethanol Byproducts and Related Subsystems (‘858) Patent Litig.,
Nos. 1:10-ML-02181-LJM, 1:13-mc-00058-LJM-DML, 2013 WL 3820593, at *1 (S.D. Ind.
July 23, 2013) (observing that egregious acts to deceive the PTO “serve as a proxy for
materiality”).
121. See Gordon & Stack, supra note 43, at 90 (stating that the court in Therasense did
not limit per se materiality to serious misconduct and may allow for trivial infractions to be
per se material).
122. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293 (discussing the evolution of the inequitable conduct
doctrine).
123. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (separating the intent and materiality
determinations). Accord Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (vacating the lower court’s finding of intent because the lower court did not
separately analyze materiality and intent). But see B-K Lighting, Inc. v. Vision3 Lighting,
930 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (noting sliding scale approvingly, postTherasense).
124. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (majority opinion) (“Intent and materiality are
separate requirements.”); Id. at 1297 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[I]ntent to deceive and materiality must be found separately.”); Id. at 1304 (Bryson, J.,
dissenting) (“Intent to mislead and materiality must be separately proved.”).
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concerning materiality and intent are subject to appellate review for clear
error, and a district court’s ultimate determination as to whether an act is
inequitable is reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion, and subsequent
cases have agreed.125
C. PTO Proposed Rulemaking
Two months after the Federal Circuit issued its decision in
Therasense, the PTO, which had opposed a but-for materiality standard in
the en banc proceeding,126 issued a notice of proposed rulemaking with
respect to Rule 56. The proposed amended rule modified the duty of
disclosure by limiting the scope of materiality in a manner consistent with
the but-for standard announced in Therasense. The proposed amended rule
provided that information is material to patentability if it is material under
the standard set forth in Therasense, and information is material to
patentability under Therasense if: “(1) the [PTO] would not allow a claim
if it were aware of the information, applying the preponderance of the
evidence standard and giving the claim its broadest reasonable
construction; or (2) the applicant engages in affirmative egregious
misconduct before the [PTO] as to the information.”127 The PTO noted that
it was not required to harmonize the materiality standards underlying Rule
56’s duty of disclosure and the inequitable conduct doctrine, but then
identified harmony and simplicity within the U.S. patent system as the
primary justifications for its proposed revision.128 The proposed amended
rule, like Therasense itself, gives patentees additional leeway to withhold
125. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291 (discussing the inference of intent). Accord
Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 719 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(reviewing the district court’s finding of inequitable conduct for abuse of discretion and the
findings of materiality and intent for clear error); 1st Media, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 694
F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reviewing the underlying factual findings of intent and
materiality for clear error while reviewing the finding of inequitable conduct for abuse of
discretion). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous if, despite some supporting evidence, the
‘[appellate] court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.’” Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on clearly erroneous findings of fact, is based on
erroneous interpretations of the law, or is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful.” 1st
Media, 694 F.3d at 1372 (quoting Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
126. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1305 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (noting that the PTO had
persuasively argued in its amicus brief that the but-for standard for materiality is too
restrictive).
127. Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,632 (proposed July 21, 2011)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (citing Therasense).
128. Id. at 43,633 (discussing the reasons for the proposed changes).
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information from the PTO during the examination process.129 The
proposed amended rule had not been adopted by early-2014, and indeed
rulemaking had been suspended indefinitely as the PTO grappled with
implementation of the AIA.130
D. The Negative Impact of Therasense
Therasense and amendment of Rule 56 are likely to restrict the
availability of the inequitable conduct defense in patent infringement
actions to a degree that undermines the goals of the U.S. patent system.
The most significant aspect of the case is the elevation of materiality to a
but-for standard. As indicated, the new standard means that prior art is
“but-for” material only if the PTO would not have allowed the claim if it
had been aware of the undisclosed art. This rejection of current Rule 56
constituted the critical disagreement between the Therasense majority of
six judges and the dissent of four. As noted by the dissent, the majority’s
adoption of a “[d]raconian”131 new materiality standard departed from both
principles of materiality commonly applied by courts in other contexts and
the line of Supreme Court precedent set forth in the trilogy of Precision,
Hazel-Atlas, and Keystone.132
In that trilogy, the Supreme Court
recognized the importance of both uncompromising candor to the PTO by
patent applicants and a flexible approach to equitable claims133—something

129. Sona De, The Inequitable Conduct Defense: Before and After Therasense, 24 No. 9
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 15, 17 (2012) (discussing the impact of Therasense).
130. FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP, INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT – JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS, 3, 15 (May 16, 2013), available at
http://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/patentlawintensive/thursday_Ir
ving-May_16_Inequitable_Conduct.pdf (discussing how a practitioner might adjust to Rule
56); Tony Dutra, Cert Petition Attacking Therasense Standard Too Soon, Wrong Case,
Solicitor General Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.bna.com/cert-petition-attacking-n17179876976/ (reporting PTO’s decision to
table rulemaking until after AIA’s requirements of the agency are fully implemented).
131. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1304 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
132. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1317 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s
decision in Therasense eschews precedent). Many commentators agree. See, e.g., James J.
Schneider, Therasense-Less: How the Federal Circuit Let Policy Overtake Precedent in
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 53 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 223, 232
(2012) (stating that the rigid but-for test of materiality contravenes the flexible standard
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Precision).
133. See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944)
(“[T]his equitable procedure has always been characterized by flexibility which enables it to
meet new situations which demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief
necessary to correct the particular injustices involved in these situations.”); Keystone Driller
Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1933) (noting that courts applying
unclean hands “are not bound by formula or restrained by any limitation that tends to
trammel the free and just exercise of discretion”).
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that is wholly lacking in but-for materiality.
The Supreme Court has emphasized equity’s flexible nature in
numerous other cases as well,134 and it has repeatedly emphasized the
importance of discretionary standards in patent law. It reversed the Federal
Circuit for adopting an absolute bar to the application of the doctrine of
equivalents,135 for adopting a rule that patentees were automatically entitled
to injunctive relief once infringement and validity were decided,136 for
establishing an exclusive test for granting declaratory judgments,137 for
holding that method patents could never be exhausted,138 for relying
exclusively on a single test for proving obviousness,139 and for utilizing a
bright-line test for patentable subject matter.140 The Federal Circuit’s
adoption of but-for materiality in Therasense as a response to doctrinal
uncertainty regarding inequitable conduct rejects both the Supreme Court’s
heavy emphasis on the use of discretionary standards in patent law and
traditional notions of equitable flexibility.141
The “egregious misconduct” exception was designed by the
Therasense majority to mitigate the harshness of its new materiality
standard. The court explained that “by creating an exception to punish
affirmative egregious acts without penalizing the failure to disclose
information that would not have changed the issuance decision, this court
strikes a necessary balance between encouraging honesty before the PTO
134. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (noting that
flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished equitable jurisdiction); Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1945) (“Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on
flexibility.”).
135. Festo Corp. v. Shoketzu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002)
(emphasizing that the Supreme Court consistently uses a flexible, not rigid, approach when
applying the doctrine of equivalents).
136. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding that the
Federal Circuit erred in its categorical grant of injunctive relief).
137. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (holding that a
patent licensee need not terminate or breach a license agreement in order to meet the “actual
case or controversy” requirement under Article III of the Constitution and seek declaratory
judgment).
138. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 628-30 (2008) (holding
that the exhaustion doctrine applies to method patents).
139. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419-22 (2007) (holding that the TSM
test for obviousness should not be used as a rigid formula and noting that “[r]igid
preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense . . . are neither necessary
under our case law nor consistent with it”). Id. at 421.
140. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (rejecting the argument that the
machine-or-transformation test is the exclusive test for determining what constitutes a
patentable process).
141. The failure of the Federal Circuit in Therasense to adhere to inequitable conduct’s
equitable tradition is critiqued in T. Leigh Anenson & Gideon Mark, Inequitable Conduct in
Retrospective: Understanding Unclean Hands in Patent Remedies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1441
(2013).
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and preventing unfounded accusations of inequitable conduct.”142 But the
exception has no clear definition and applies only to affirmative
misrepresentations.143 It does not apply in cases of nondisclosure or failure
to mention prior art references in an affidavit.144 Neither of these events
renders an affidavit unmistakably false—the one specific example of
egregious misconduct that the court provided.145 And it is “unclear
whether . . . complete lack of diligence in submitting relevant information
to the Patent Office, or deliberate attempts to remain unaware of potentially
relevant information” would constitute egregious misconduct.146 In short,
the exception will be rare,147 and will do little to mitigate the rigidity of the
new but-for standard.
Moreover, the exception, similar to the general standard, eschews both
traditional notions of equity and the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the
use of discretionary standards in patent law. The carve-out to but-for
materiality only applies if the rigid threshold of egregious affirmative
misconduct is met. Such rigidity permits no opportunity for courts to
exercise their equitable discretion.
Difficulty in establishing materiality post-Therasense is not the only
obstacle confronted by accused patent infringers seeking to utilize the
inequitable conduct defense.
Another obstacle is presented by
Therasense’s holding about intent. Direct evidence of intent to deceive the
PTO is scarce,148 primarily because the decision to refrain from disclosure
142. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
143. Id. at 1293; Cotter, supra note 22, at 745.
144. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292-93; Senju Pharm. Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 921 F. Supp.
2d 297, 308 n.15 (D. Del. 2013) (“Omissions . . . cannot constitute affirmative egregious
misconduct.”).
145. See TV Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., No. C 10-0475 PJH, 2012 WL
6020113, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (observing that filing a false affidavit is “the sole
type of ‘egregious affirmative act’ identified by the Federal Circuit as providing an
exception to the requirement of ‘but-for’ materiality”). But cf. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v.
Interlace Med., Inc., No. 10-10951-RWZ, 2013 WL 3289085, at *2 (D. Mass. June 27,
2013) (asserting that affirmative egregious misconduct, as described in Therasense, also
includes “suborning perjury, bribing witnesses, and actively suppressing evidence”).
146. Bhattacharyya & McGurk, supra note 84, at 632.
147. See Gino Cheng, Robert M. Isackson & Thomas J. Gray, Inequitable Conduct:
Rethinking ‘Egregious Misconduct’, LAW360 (Jan. 9, 2013, 12:16 PM),
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/inequitable-conduct-analysis/
(“Far from the inside track to leapfrog over the ‘but-for’ materiality test set forth by the bare
majority in Therasense . . . the defense tactic of alleging egregious misconduct appears to be
a detour—at least for now.”). Post-Therasense courts have been very reluctant to apply the
egregious misconduct exception. See, e.g., Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 891 F.
Supp. 2d 588, 649 n.21 (D. Del. 2012) (rejecting application of exception because
statements to PTO “were merely a statement of the hypothesis to be tested during the
regulatory approval process”).
148. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
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is rarely documented. Even where direct evidence of intent does exist, it
likely is shielded from discovery by the attorney-client privilege.149 Patent
applicants, by involving an attorney in important discussions throughout
the patent application process, may claim privilege over numerous
categories of documents, including potentially “‘smoking gun’”
documents.150 Thus, such documents are unlikely to emerge during
discovery, and direct evidence of intent will be rare.
Moreover, under applicable Federal Circuit law, the assertion of
attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine and the
withholding of advice of counsel cannot yield an adverse inference as to
the nature of the advice.151 This jurisprudence essentially forces federal
district courts to make positive inferences and “produces a tremendous
structural advantage for the party accused of inequitable conduct, while
encouraging the abuse of privilege.”152 The crime-fraud exception153 to the
attorney-client privilege is unlikely to reduce this advantage in most cases,
because under Federal Circuit law, “a party must establish Walker Process
fraud . . . to successfully pierce the attorney-client privilege.”154 As is set
forth infra, Walker Process fraud will be virtually impossible to prove postTherasense.
The unavailability of direct evidence of intent is critical. In the
absence of direct evidence, a post-Therasense court may find specific intent
to deceive the PTO only if it is the most reasonable inference arising from
the circumstantial evidence.155 As the Federal Circuit noted, “[i]f multiple

149. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Ltd., No. 3:10-CV-276-F,
2013 WL 2338345, at *5 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2013) (noting that the record in the case had
significant gaps because many documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege,
and lamenting that these gaps made adjudication of intent a difficult task).
150. Id. at *5 (noting the unlikelihood of such potentially incriminatory documents ever
surfacing in inequitable conduct cases).
151. See Knorr-Breme Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (extending to patent cases the rule that declines to impose
adverse inferences on invocation of the attorney-client privilege); accord Golden Blount,
Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that a
threshold showing of culpable behavior “cannot be satisfied merely by proof that the
accused is asserting the attorney-client privilege to withhold an opinion of counsel”).
152. Gen. Elec. Co., 2013 WL 2338345 at *8.
153. “‘The party seeking discovery of privileged communications or documents must
prove the crime-fraud exception applies by showing: (1) a prima facie case of criminal or
fraudulent conduct, and (2) the communications were made in furtherance of the crime or
fraud.’” Shelbyzyme, LLC v. Genzyme Corp., No. 09-768-GMS, 2013 WL 3229964, at *1
n.1 (D. Del. June 25, 2013) (quoting Magnetar Techs. Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Park Inc.,
886 F. Supp. 2d 466, 482 (D. Del. 2012)).
154. Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
155. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. Accord 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. LogMeIn,
Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1007, 2013 WL 3270648, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013).
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reasonable inferences can be drawn, ‘intent to deceive cannot be found.’”156
Post-Therasense, the Federal Circuit has “rigorously enforced” the most
reasonable inference requirement.157
The harsh Therasense requirements have at least two negative effects.
First, because they are, in the words of one federal district court, “nearly
insurmountable,”158 they bar numerous potentially meritorious claims.
Post-Therasense courts have been very reluctant to infer intent based on
circumstantial evidence. In the first six months after the en banc
Therasense decision was issued, district courts rendered final decisions in
fourteen cases involving inequitable conduct. These courts found the
specific intent required by Therasense in only one of the cases, and they
found inequitable conduct in none of them.159
Second, they create a roadmap to success for dishonest patent
applicants and thus encourage misconduct. Post-Therasense, a dishonest
patent applicant is less likely to be found to have engaged in inequitable
conduct if it makes no disclosure of prior art than if it makes selective
disclosure. If it makes no disclosure then there is likely to be no written
evidence of intent to deceive and therefore immunization of inaction.
Conversely, if the applicant makes selective disclosure there will be some
written evidence that it made the deliberate decision to disclose some art
while withholding other references. Therasense thus creates a perverse
incentive to withhold material information from the PTO.160
Therasense’s elevated standards concerning materiality and intent are
not only applicable at trial. The standards also apply at the summary
156. TV Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., No. C 10-0475 PJH, 2012 WL 6020113,
at *23 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (quoting Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1920-91).
157. Lisa A. Dolak, Litigating Inequitable Conduct After Therasense, Exergen and the
AIA: Lessons for Litigants, Options for Owners, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 51, 57
(2013). A pattern of deceit strengthens an inference of intent to deceive. Intellect Wireless,
Inc. v. HTC Corp., 732 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding such a pattern in this
case).
158. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Ltd., No. 3:10-CV-276-F, 2013 WL
2338345, at *5 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2013) (observing that the requirement of
“deliberateness” creates a hurdle that is “unlikely to be jumped in all but the rarest cases”).
159. Peter G. Thurlow & Maya Elbert, Inequitable Conduct: Analysis of PostTherasense Decisions and the Supplemental Examination Provision of the America Invents
Act, 5 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS – INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 48 (Nov. 16, 2011). The
authors conclude that “[a]s difficult as it may be for a patent challenger to establish
materiality, it may be even more difficult to establish the requisite level of intent.” Id.
160. See Brandee N. Woolard, Issue Brief, The Resurrection of the Duty to Inquire After
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 42, 44 (2014)
(noting that Therasense “disincentivizes patent practitioners from seeking out material
information.”); Maurice Ross, A Year of Dramatic Change in Intellectual Property Law:
Who are the Winners and Losers?, ASPATORE, 2013 WL 571327, at *8 (Jan. 2013)
(observing that Therasense and AIA collectively provide “perverse incentives for cheating
and fraud.”).
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judgment stage,161 where the burden of proving inequitable conduct is
particularly onerous.162 The standards also operate to effectively raise the
standard for pleading inequitable conduct. The Federal Circuit established
the current strict pleading standard two years prior to Therasense, when it
held in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.163 that inequitable conduct
must be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure164 by identifying “the specific who, what, when, where, and
how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the
PTO.”165 Failure to identify each of these factual elements constitutes an
incurable deficiency under Rule 9(b).166
In Exergen, the Federal Circuit applied its own law to determine the
appropriate pleading standard, but it adopted the approach for pleading
fraud previously articulated by the Seventh Circuit.167 This adoption
disregarded both the text of Rule 9(b), which expressly requires
particularity only when pleading fraud or mistake,168 and the law of
inequitable conduct, which does not include reliance as an element and thus
is broader than common law fraud.169 Prior to Exergen, the Federal Circuit
underscored that “[i]nequitable conduct . . . is a lesser offense than
common law fraud.”170 In Exergen, the court substantially raised the
standard for pleading inequitable conduct, whether as a counterclaim or as
an affirmative defense,171 by importing the inapposite standard for pleading
161. See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., No. 1:10cv910 LMB/TRJ, 2013
WL 265602, at *30 (E.D. Va. Jan. 22, 2013).
162. See Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Sec. Instr., Inc., 606 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“We rarely affirm a grant of summary judgment of inequitable conduct . . . .”);
Morningware, Inc. v. Hearthware Home Products, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1041 (N.D.
Ill. 2012) (“[The] burden of proving inequitable conduct at the summary judgment stage is
particularly onerous . . . .”); TecSec, Inc. v. Int’l Business Mach. Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d
800, 809 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“The Federal Circuit has repeatedly indicated that inequitable
conduct defenses are disfavored, particularly at the summary judgment stage.”).
163. 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
165. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1328.
166. Prowess, Inc. v. RaySearch Labs., AB, No. WDQ-11-1357, 2013 WL 3480319, at
*7 (D. Md. July 9, 2013).
167. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1326-27. The earlier Seventh Circuit decision is DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
168. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
169. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that
inequitable conduct “is a broader, more inclusive concept” than common law fraud).
170. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir.
1989). See also David Hricik, Wrong About Everything: The Application by the District
Courts of Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct, 86 MARQ. L. LEV. 895, 913 (2003) (“[T]he
Federal Circuit has . . . recognized that inequitable conduct does not require proof of
fraud.”).
171. See Senju Pharm. Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 297, 306 (D. Del. 2013)
(“Apotex’s counterclaim and affirmative defense for inequitable conduct rise or fall
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fraud.172
Exergen’s “who” requirement requires identification of the specific
individual(s) alleged to have engaged in inequitable conduct. General
references to categories of persons, such as inventors or corporate entities,
do not suffice,173 in part because “the duty of candor and good faith in
dealing with the PTO is inapplicable to organizations.”174 The “what”
requirement involves both the nature of the inequitable conduct (for
example, whether there was a material omission or material
misrepresentation) and the relevance of that conduct to specific patent
claims.175
Compliance with Exergen’s “where” requirement is a function of the
nature of the alleged inequitable misconduct. If the conduct involves a
failure to disclose prior art, then defendant is required to specifically
identify the location of the material information within the reference.176 If
the conduct involves a failure to disclose relevant sales, offers for sales, or
litigation, then defendant is required to specifically identify the location of
the activity. A general identification is insufficient.177 Compliance with
together.”); XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 376, 379-83 (D. Del.
2012) (assessing the sufficiency of counterclaims and affirmative defenses of inequitable
conduct together); Southco, Inc. v. Penn Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 768 F. Supp. 2d 715, 721-24
(D. Del. 2011) (same); cf. ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1314,
1321 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (construing affirmative defense of inequitable conduct as a
counterclaim and then striking it as redundant of existing counterclaim for inequitable
conduct).
172. See, e.g., Adam R. Andrea, Case Note and Comment, Exergen v. Wal-Mart: A
Costly Cure for the Plague of Inequitable Conduct Claims, 20 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. L. 449, 462 (2010) (“The court provided virtually no justification for its
application of Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct.”); see also David O. Taylor, Patent Fraud,
83 TEMPLE L. REV. 49, 73 (2010) (“Exergen may represent the first foray into the adoption
of principles from the law of fraud into the law of inequitable conduct.”).
173. See, e.g., Sepracor, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-cv-01302
(DMC)(MF), 2010 WL 2326262, at *6 (D.N.J. June 7, 2010) (holding that general
references to “patent applicants and Sepracor” were insufficient).
174. Senju, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 307.
175. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“The pleading fails to identify which claims, and which limitations in those claims, the
withheld references are relevant to . . . .”).
176. Bruce D. DeRenzi & Sean E. Jackson, A Procedural Remedy for the ‘Plague’?
Pleading Inequitable Conduct after Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., NYIPLA
BULLETIN (N.Y. Intellectual Prop. Ass’n), Aug./Sept. 2010, at 9-11, available at
http://www.crowell.com/documents/A-Procedural-Remedy-for-the-Plague-PleadingInequitable-Conduct-After-Exergen-Corp-v-Wal-Mart.pdf See also Aevoe Corp. v. AE
Tech. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00053-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 876036, at *7 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2013)
(noting that to satisfy “where” requirement, the pleading must specifically identify to which
claims, and which limitations in those claims, the withheld references are relevant).
177. See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Bel Fuse Inc., No. C-07-06222 RMW, 2010 WL
246811, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2010) (holding that allegation of product sales “in the
United States” was insufficient).
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Exergen’s “when” requirement similarly is a function of the nature of the
alleged conduct. A simple allegation that inequitable conduct occurred
during patent prosecution may suffice in some cases, but in many other
cases defendants may be required to identify the publication dates of
references, press release issue dates, and contract execution dates.178
Compliance with the “how” requirement entails an explanation of
“how a patent examiner would have used undisclosed information in
determining the patentability of the claims.”179 This has been described as
the “most onerous step in the Exergen analysis.”180 The pleading must
explain the manner in which the information is “material and noncumulative.”181 The controlling inquiry is whether the allegations “put
Plaintiffs on notice as to what information Defendants contend should have
been provided to the examiner but wasn’t, and how that information would
have changed the examiner’s decision.”182 There is some confusion among
the federal district courts as to whether Exergen also imposes a separate
“why” requirement. It is not clear that either Rule 9(b) or the prior Seventh
Circuit decision on which Exergen is based mandates such a showing.183 In
any event, a pleading which satisfies the “how” element likely also satisfies
the “why” element.184 As in the case of “how,” satisfaction of the “why”
element requires pleading “with specificity that the undisclosed
information is not cumulative of the information that was disclosed during
prosecution.”185
Therasense did not specifically address the pleading requirements for
an inequitable conduct defense,186 and by January 2014, no federal decision
178. DeRenzi & Jackson, supra note 176, at 11.
179. Aevoe Corp., 2013 WL 876036 at *8.
180. See McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc. v. Lacks Indus., Inc., No. 09-cv11594, 2010 WL 4643081, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2010).
181. Aevoe Corp., 2013 WL 876036, at *5.
182. Lincoln Nat’l Life v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 1:07-cv-265, 2010 WL 1781013,
at *8 (N.D. Ind. May 3, 2010).
183. See, e.g., Lincoln Nat’l Life, 2010 WL 1781013 at *6 (holding that there is no
separate “why” requirement); Johnson Outdoors Inc. v. Navico, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1191,
1197 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (suggesting that there is no “independent ‘why’ requirement.”).
184. See DeRenzi & Jackson, supra note 176, at 12 (observing that pleading
requirements for inequitable conduct meld together the “how” and “why” elements).
185. Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00053-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 876036,
at *8 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2013). See Oracle Corp. v. DrugLogic, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 885, 897
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing inequitable conduct defense and counterclaim in part for
failure to allege facts to support inference that withheld information was not cumulative).
186. See Cutsforth, Inc. v. LEMM Liquidating Co., No. 12-cv-1200 (SRN/JSM), 2013
WL 2455979, at *4 (D. Minn. June 6, 2013) (“Therasense did not address inequitable
conduct claims at the pleading stage nor did it override Exergen’s pleading requirements.”);
Waters Indus., Inc. v. JJI Int’l, Inc., No. 11 C 3791, 2012 WL 5966534, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
28, 2012) (same); Bayer Cropscience AG v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, Civil No. 10-1045
(RMB/JS), 2012 WL 1253047, at *2 (D. Del. Apr. 12, 2012).
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pre- or post-Therasense held that the facts set forth in a pleading alleging
inequitable conduct must meet the clear and convincing standard.187 But
Therasense did raise the hurdle in substance insofar as all of the elements
of the new inequitable conduct standard now must be pled with
particularity,188 and if they are not an inequitable conduct counterclaim
must be dismissed and a parallel affirmative defense must be stricken.189
This is true even though Rule 9(b), which requires allegations of fraud to
be pleaded with particularity, permits the intent element to be pleaded
without specificity.190 This elevated pleading standard “is the most onerous
in all of civil litigation.”191 Moreover, several district courts have held that
“Therasense raised the pleading bar so that specific intent to deceive must
be the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn” from the facts
alleged, rather than merely a reasonable inference.192 Accordingly, while
187. See Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Hitachi Koki Co., No. 09-948, 2012 WL
1952977, at *6 (E.D. Wis. May 29, 2012) (holding that Therasense does not apply to the
pleading stage, and applying Exergen); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Medtronics, Inc., 850
F. Supp. 2d 630, 635 (E.D. Va. 2013) (“Although the facts alleged in [defendant’s]
counterclaim may not be enough to satisfy the Therasense elements by clear and convincing
evidence, the alleged facts are sufficient to satisfy Exergen’s pleading requirements.”);
Human Genome Scis., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-6519-MRP (JEMx), 2011 WL
7461786, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (“No Federal Circuit decision, before Therasense or
after Therasense, has stated that the facts in a pleading for inequitable conduct must meet
the clear and convincing standard.”).
188. Evonik Degussa GMBH v. Materia Inc., No. 09-cv-636 (NLH-JS), 2012 WL
4503771, at *4 (D. Del. Oct. 1, 2012) (“[T]he proper standard to apply at this stage in the
proceedings is the standard set forth in Exergen. As stated in Exergen, a claim for
inequitable conduct must be plead with particularity under Rule 9(b).”); Thurlow & Elbert,
supra note 159, at 25 (“Therasense, without changing the Exergen standard for pleading
inequitable conduct in form, heightens it in substance since all of the elements of the new
inequitable conduct standard, including ‘but-for’ materiality and specific intent, must be
supported with particularized allegations.”); cf. Butamax v. Gevo, Inc., Civ. No. 11-54-SLR,
2013 WL 571801, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 13, 2013) (“[T]he standard for proving inequitable
conduct is a more rigorous one than the standard for pleading inequitable conduct;
apparently, even the Federal Circuit has been tempted to confuse the same.”).
189. B-K Lighting, Inc. v. Vision3 Lighting, No. CV 06-02825 MMM (PLAx), 2013
WL 941839, at *21 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013); see also Mycone Dental Supply Co. v.
Creative Nail Design, Inc., Civil Action No. 11-4380 (JBS-KMW), 2013 WL 3216145, at
*6 (D.N.J. June 24, 2013) (“[T]he heightened standards for proving inequitable conduct
recently set by the Federal Circuit are reflected in the heightened standards that are required
for pleading inequitable conduct at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.”).
190. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“[A] party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s
mind may be alleged generally.”).
191. Chiang, supra note 3, at 1268.
192. Hansen Mfg. Corp. v. Enduro Sys., Inc., No. 11-cv-4030, 2011 WL 5526627, at *4
(D.S.D. Nov. 14, 2011); see also Quest Software, Inc. v. Centrify Corp., No. 2:10-cv-859,
2011 WL 5508820, at *2-3 (D. Utah Nov. 9, 2011). Other courts have disagreed and held
that claimant need only allege facts from which the court could reasonably infer that the
patent applicant made a deliberate decision to deceive the PTO. See, e.g., Cutsforth, Inc. v.
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Exergen alone had no significant downward impact on the number of cases
alleging inequitable conduct,193 Exergen in combination with Therasense
has had a substantial chilling effect. The heightened pleading burden in
tandem with the heightened substantive burden has operated to deter and
foreclose many assertions of the inequitable conduct defense, particularly
because Federal Circuit law controls with respect to both the pleading194
and the proof195 of inequitable conduct. During the period from 2008 to
2012 the percentage of Answers that were filed in patent cases that
contained the term “inequitable conduct” declined sharply from forty-one
percent to twenty-one percent.196 This decline is likely a reaction to the
virtually insurmountable barriers created by Exergen and Therasense. In
the last six months of 2011, seventeen of nineteen district court rulings on
the pleadings resulted in the dismissal of inequitable conduct claims.197
LEMM Liquidating Co., No. 12-cv-1200 (SRN/JSM), 2013 WL 2455979, at *4 (D. Minn.
June 6, 2013) (holding that court must determine whether it could “reasonably infer that the
[USPTO] would not have allowed the claim if it had been aware of the undisclosed
reference”); CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. CIVIX-DDI, LLC, Nos. 12 C 4968, 12 C 7091, 12
C 8632, 2013 WL 2151548, at *11 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2013) (holding that “[a]t the pleading
stage, the proponent of inequitable conduct need only plead sufficient facts that the court
‘may reasonably infer’ knowledge and intent.”); Aeveo Corp. v. AE Tech Co., No. 2:12-cv00053-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 876036, at *10 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2013) (determining that the
claimant need only allege facts from which court could make reasonable inferences
regarding deliberate deceit).
193. Panacea, supra note 93, at 396 (concluding that Exergen “has not appeared to stem
the tide of inequitable conduct allegations”). But cf. Andrea, supra note 172, at 469
(concluding that Exergen will hinder the assertion of many legitimate inequitable conduct
claims, thereby creating “incentives for unscrupulous applicants and attorneys to conceal
material information from the PTO”); Lisa A. Dolak, Beware the Inequitable Conduct
Charge! (Why Practitioners Submit What They Submit), 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 558, 568 (2009) (observing that Exergen “has the potential to dramatically alter the
inequitable conduct landscape by curbing misconduct allegations at their source – the
pleadings”); Benjamin Johnson, Note, The Federal Circuit’s Inequitable Conduct Standard
After Exergen v. Wal-Mart: A Step in the Right Direction, but Will it Really Change
Anything?, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 360, 370 (2010) (predicting that post-Exergen,
defendants in patent infringement cases “will be considerably more conservative in their use
of the inequitable conduct” defense).
194. See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(noting that “whether inequitable conduct has been adequately pleaded is a question of
Federal Circuit law”). Accord Cumberland Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Institut., LLC, No. 12 C
3846, 2012 WL 6567922, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2012) (holding that Federal Circuit law
governs heightened pleading requirement).
195. See Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327 n.3 (enumerating the elements of inequitable
conduct); Zep Solar, Inc. v. Westinghouse Solar, Inc., No. C 11-06493 JSW, 2012 WL
1293873, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012) (stating that “Federal Circuit law governs
sufficiency of allegations of inequitable conduct”).
196. Rantanen, supra note 64, at 101.
197. See Carlson, supra note 70, at 10. Where inequitable conduct pleadings have been
found insufficient, courts have not infrequently granted leave to amend. But leave is neither
assured nor a guarantee of success. See, e.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung
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And during the period from June 2011 to April 2013, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a district court’s finding of inequitable conduct only once.198
The foregoing effects are magnified because there is no effective
substitute for the inequitable conduct defense. The doctrine of unclean
hands, from which inequitable conduct derives, and which remains intact
post-Therasense,199 is a distinct doctrine with its own considerations.200
Unclean hands generally cannot be raised by a party who is foreign to the
alleged unclean conduct at the time of its occurrence.201 In addition,
whereas application of the inequitable conduct doctrine results in the
unenforceability of the entire patent, the unclean hands defense merely
allows courts to dismiss complaints filed by plaintiffs suing in bad faith.202
The Supreme Court has never granted certiorari on a petition
involving inequitable conduct in its modern incarnation.203 Unless it does
so, the Federal Circuit’s harsh restrictions on the use of the inequitable
conduct defense will be operative for the foreseeable future. These
restrictions, particularly Therasense’s adoption of but-for materiality, will
have numerous negative effects. First, they will function to reduce the
incentive for patent applicants to be candid with the PTO and thereby

Elecs. Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 892, 903 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (denying in part and granting in part
request for leave to amend inequitable conduct counterclaims).
198. Rantanen, supra note 64, at 111; see also Chiang, supra note 3, at 1286 (noting that
the Federal Circuit is approaching the point of never finding inequitable conduct to be
proven).
199. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287 (noting that “the unclean hands doctrine remains
available to supply a remedy for egregious misconduct”). Egregious misconduct might
provide a basis for equitable relief other than patent unenforceability where it falls short of
inequitable conduct.
200. See, e.g., Nordock Inc. v. Sys. Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 577, 605 (E.D. Wis. 2013)
(holding that the trial court has broad discretion under the unclean hands doctrine).
201. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Ltd., No. 3:10-CV-276-F, 2013 WL
2338345, at *28 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2013) (noting that “misconduct unrelated to the matter
at litigation is not relevant to the demonstration of inequitable conduct during the
prosecution of the patent at issue”); Nicole M. Murphy, Note, Inequitable Conduct Doctrine
Reform: Is the Death Penalty for Patents Still Appropriate?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2274, 2286
(2009) (noting that a party foreign to the alleged misconduct cannot raise unclean hands
defense).
202. See Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro Tech., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 160, 169, 175-76 (D.
Mass. 2011) (citing Therasense for the proposition that a finding of inequitable conduct
results in unenforceability of an entire patent); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co.,
290 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1933) (affirming dismissal of patent infringement action on basis of
unclean hands).
203. No petition was filed by defendants in Therasense. In October 2013 the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in a post-Therasense case concerning the inequitable conduct
doctrine. See Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC v. 1st Media, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 418 (2013);
David Hricik, Supremes Deny Cert in Sony v. First Media: An Update, PATENTLY-O (Oct.
15,
2013),
http://patentlyo.com/hricik/2013/10/supremes-deny-cert-in-sony-v-firstmedia.html.
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undermine one of the primary goals of the U.S. patent system.204
Second, the restrictions will reduce patent quality,205 insofar as the
duty of candor owed by patent applicants to the PTO helps ensure quality
patents. Critics have long complained that the PTO, which in 2013 granted
approximately 278,000 patents,206 grants far too many low-quality
patents.207 According to one frequently cited study, courts have found
invalid forty-six percent of patents litigated to judgment.208 Patent quality
204. See Taylor, supra note 88, at 125 (observing that adoption by PTO of Therasense
materiality standard “may encourage applicants to withhold relevant prior art.”). See also
Elizabeth Peters, Note, Are We Living in a Material World?: An Analysis of the Federal
Circuit’s Materiality Standard under the Patent Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 93 IOWA
L. REV. 1519, 1522 (2008) (noting vital role that doctrine of inequitable conduct plays in
preserving fairness of U.S. patent system).
205. “Patent quality” has been defined as “the capacity of a granted patent to meet (or
exceed) the statutory standards of patentability—most importantly, to [cover inventions
which are] novel, nonobvious, and clearly and sufficiently described.” R. Polk Wagner,
Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2009). Accord
Sean B. Seymour, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 990-91 (2013)
(reinforcing the consensus opinion that a patent’s quality is measured in terms of its novelty,
obviousness, and clarity of description). A high-quality patent is “one that covers an
invention that would not otherwise be made [but for the incentive of a patent] or one that
ensures that a good idea is commercialized . . . .” Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff,
Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System—Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 991 (2004); accord Seymour at 991 n.3 (noting the positive
business effects of patents created by their encouragement of inventive processes).
206. Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Utility Patents Granted in 2013: A New Record
(for
the
Fourth
Consecutive
Year),
PATENTLY-O
(Jan.
2,
2014),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/utility-patents-granted-in-2013-a-new-record-for-thefourth-consecutive-year.html.
207. See, e.g., Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases,
101 GEO. L.J. 637, 640-41 (2013) (“The PTO issues scores of invalid patents every
year. . . .”); Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review,
and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 123 (2006) (“There is a crisis of patent
quality. Patents are being issued that are vague and overbroad, lack novelty, and fail the
constitutional mandate ‘[t]o promote the progress of Science and useful Arts.”); Wagner,
supra note 205, at 2136 (“[T]he need to improve patent quality is essentially undisputed.”).
208. See John A. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (illustrating the ratios of valid and invalid
litigated patents). This figure excludes settled cases, which could involve a greater
frequency of valid patents. Id. Other older studies also have found high rates of invalidity.
See, e.g., Kimberley A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 392 (2000) (noting that judges upheld validity of
patents in only sixty-four percent of cases during the period 1983-1999). An unpublished
2012 study found much higher invalidity rates. This study examined 283 cases where patent
validity was determined by a federal district court during the period from 2007 to 2011. It
concluded that cases in which claims in a patent were held valid decreased from twenty
percent in 2007 to six percent in 2011, and averaged only fourteen percent during the study
period. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, UNITED STATES PATENT INVALIDITY STUDY 2012, at 2,
available at https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/Smyth_USPatentInvalidity_Sept12.pdf.
The same study also found that when the district court invalidated a patent, the Federal
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is a function of multiple factors. One such factor is time – patent
examiners average a mere eighteen hours per patent application209 and this
short window has undermined the PTO’s ability to provide adequate
examinations.210 A second factor is money. Some recent evidence suggests
that the PTO, whose “budget is largely derived from patent examination
and post-allowance fees,”211 is biased toward granting patents.
Specifically, the PTO preferentially grants “patents on technologies with
high renewal rates and patent applications filed by large entities,” because
such patents generate the most revenue.212
A third critical factor is the scope of disclosure to the PTO. Rule 56
underscores this point: “[T]he most effective patent examination occurs
when . . . the [PTO] is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all
information material to patentability.”213 Pre-Therasense, the inequitable
conduct doctrine addressed the patent-quality problem by increasing the
flow of information to examiners.214 Post-Therasense, with the incentive
for candor diminished by the Federal Circuit and the corresponding
proposed revision of Rule 56, the PTO will become even more poorly
informed about inventions and relevant art than it is already.215 This will
undoubtedly have negative consequences, as it cannot help but to further
erode patent quality. Society benefits when the PTO grants high-quality
patents and suffers when it grants low-quality patents. The issuance of
valid patents creates incentives for innovation and promotes the
commercialization of beneficial technical advances,216 whereas bad patents

Circuit affirmed that decision in more than 70 percent of the cases during the period 20022012. Id. at 8.
209. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1500 (2001).
210. See Doug Lichtman & Mark Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 46-47 (2007) (noting that resource and time constraints
hinder accurate evaluation of patents).
211. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 67, 69 (2013).
212. Id. at 70.
213. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009). Numerous courts and commentators agree. See, e.g.,
Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Raritan Americas, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 229, 242 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (“The public interest is best served when the USPTO is aware of all information
material to patentability.”); Seymour, supra note 205, at 1039 (“The quality of an issued
patent depends on the quality of the underlying Patent Office examination. To a large extent
the assurance of a good Patent Office examination is all about information.”).
214. See Cotropia, supra note 60, at 755 (noting that historically, the inequitable
conduct doctrine helped address the patent quality problem).
215. Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 79, at 242 (concluding that the PTO “will be
even more in the dark when conducting patent examinations after Therasense than it was
before”).
216. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
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(with their presumption of validity) tend to block innovation.
As will be shown below, the adoption of the AIA has served to
exacerbate the foregoing negative effects of the Therasense decision. The
combination of Therasense and AIA has substantially limited the use of the
inequitable conduct defense. There has been a significant reduction in both
the assertion of the defense217 and the success of the defense. In the first
year after Therasense was decided, federal district courts granted eleven
motions for summary judgment seeking a finding of no inequitable
conduct, while denying only three such motions.218 In the same time period
federal district courts issued thirteen post-trial opinions finding no
inequitable conduct and only three opinions finding such conduct.219 More
recently, district court dismissals of inequitable conduct claims have
continued to rise.220
E. Walker Process Antitrust Claims
Beyond its negative impact on the use of the inequitable conduct
defense, Therasense also will significantly limit the opportunity for alleged
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004) (stating that one justification for
intellectual property rights is to incentivize the creation of new ideas by protecting such
ideas from being copied freely).
217. See Ryan Davis, Inequitable Conduct a Dying Defense 2 Years Post-Therasense,
LAW360
(May
23,
2013,
9:13
PM)
available
at
http://www.law360.com/articles/444480/inequitable-conduct-a-dying-defense-2-years-posttherasense (“Proving an inequitable conduct defense in a patent case has become so difficult
because of the Federal Circuit’s Therasense ruling that attorneys rarely bother to mount it
anymore . . . .”); Daniel J. Schwartz, Leveraging Strategies and Scheduling Complexities in
Patent Cases to Design Successful Infringement Defenses, 2013 WL 574400, at *5
(Aspatore, 2013) (noting that post-Therasense “there have been far fewer inequitable
conduct decisions”); Oelke, supra note 96, at *5 (noting that the inequitable conduct defense
is pled less frequently “given that the defense is far less likely to prevail following
Therasense”).
218. Carlson, supra note 69, at 17.
219. Id.; see also White, supra note 3, at 717 (observing that combination of Therasense
and AIA “effectively eliminated” the inequitable conduct doctrine); Cheng, Isackson &
Gray, supra note 147 (noting the scarcity of post-Therasense cases finding inequitable
conduct). For a rare example of a post-Therasense court granting a motion for summary
judgment of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct, see Caron v. QuicKutz, Inc., No.
CV-09-02600-PHX-NVW, 2012 WL 5497869, at *14 (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2012) (holding
that submission of unmistakably false affidavit constituted an affirmative act of egregious
misconduct).
220. See David A. Kelly, The Impact of the America Invents Act and Recent Court
Decisions on Patent Law Practitioners and Their Clients, 2012 WL 6636449, at *11
(Aspatore, Nov. 2012) (stating that district courts increasingly dismiss inequitable conduct
claims); Bruce Wexler & Jamie Lucia, IP: Inequitable Conduct Post-Therasense,
INSIDECOUNSEL (Aug. 13, 2013) http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/08/13/ip-inequitableconduct-post-emtherasense-em (noting that district courts “have increasingly been
willing . . . to dismiss or strike inequitable conduct defenses at the pleadings stage”).
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patent infringers to assert Walker Process antitrust claims. A patent is a
monopoly by nature221 but a patent-holder can generally enforce its rights
under an unexpired patent without fear of antitrust liability under an
exception to antitrust law.222 However, the Supreme Court held in Walker
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.223 that if a
patent-holder obtained its patent by knowingly and willfully
misrepresenting facts to the PTO, such behavior may be sufficient to strip it
of its exemption from antitrust laws.224 In its decision, the Supreme Court
cited the same early unclean hands cases that are the foundation of
inequitable conduct law – Keystone, Hazel-Atlas, and Precision.225
Walker Process claims are increasingly common.226 Such claims,
which have been described as more egregious versions of inequitable
conduct,227 are typically asserted as counterclaims by defendants in patent
221. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S, 100, 135 (1969)
(referring to patent as a “legal monopoly”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225, 229 (1964) (“The grant of a patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly.”).
222. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816
(1945) (“[A] patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to
access to a free and open market.”); accord Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2223, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that a patent is an exception to
antitrust law).
223. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). Subsequent case law permits the plaintiff to make an
alternative showing – that, whether or not the patent-holder obtained the patent by fraud, the
infringement suit was a mere sham to cover what is nothing more than an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor. See Nobelpharma AB v.
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that such a sham
deprives a party of immunity from antitrust laws). This alternative showing is a separate
theory of relief that, although sometimes conflated with Walker Process fraud, is governed
by different standards. Under Professional Real Estate Investors, Inv. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993) (internal quotations omitted), a party asserting a
claim of sham litigation must show that (1) the lawsuit is objectively meritless such that no
reasonable litigant could expect success on the merits, and (2) the baseless lawsuit “conceals
an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.” In patent
litigation, a sham suit (sometimes referred to as a “PRE claim”) must be subjectively
brought in bad faith and based on a theory of infringement or invalidity that is objectively
baseless. See Cornucopia Prods., LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1103 (D. Ariz.
2012) (dismissing PRE claim); TransWeb LLC v. 3M Innovative Prop. Co., No. 10-4413
(FSH), 2011 WL 2181189, at *15 (D.N.J. June 1, 2011) (explaining elements of sham
litigation claim); see also Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071 (noting that PRE and Walker
Process provide alternative legal theories on which a patentee may lose its antitrust
immunity, and both theories may be applied to the same conduct); S.W. O’Donnell, Unified
Theory of Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Litigation, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 n.8 (2004)
(observing that, prior to Nobelpharma, the Federal Circuit was “on a path of congruence”
between Walker Process and PRE).
224. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177.
225. Id.
226. See Oelke, supra note 96 at *8-9 (observing a recent uptick in the litigation of
hybrid cases that assert a mixture of patent and Walker Process claims).
227. See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-4379 JF (RS), 2008 WL
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infringement suits.228 Under Federal Circuit law, direct purchasers of
patented products also have standing to bring Walker Process claims, even
if they lack standing to bring declaratory judgment actions to invalidate the
patents.229 In order to succeed, the complaining party must show the
patent-holder both (1) procured its patent by knowingly and willfully
misrepresenting facts to the PTO or (in the case of an assignee) maintained
and enforced the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent manner in which
it was procured, and (2) monopolized or attempted to monopolize the
relevant market, in violation of the Sherman Act.230 If the party can make
both showings, it can establish antitrust liability and obtain treble damages
under section four of the Clayton Act,231 equitable relief under section 16 of
4615605, at *5 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2008) (“Walker Process fraud essentially is a more
egregious version of inequitable conduct.”); cf. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069 (noting that
inequitable conduct is “a broader, more inclusive concept than the common law fraud
needed to support a Walker Process counterclaim”).
228. See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1067 (alleged infringer counterclaimed, asserting
antitrust violation); Cornucopia Prods., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (permitting limited
offensive use of Walker Process claim where it was substantively indistinguishable from a
typical Walker Process counterclaim); Kroger Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, 701 F. Supp. 2d 938,
960 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (“Typically, Walker Process claims are brought as counterclaims in
patent infringement lawsuits . . . .”).
229. See Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 (Fed. Cir.
2012). Ritz Camera, decided in late 2012, arguably expands the universe of potential
Walker Process claims, because patent holders can now be sued by a wide range of parties
who allege that they paid inflated prices for goods protected by patents. However, the high
bar to proving fraud before the PTO minimizes the long-term impact of the case. Indeed, in
Ritz Camera the Federal Circuit specifically rejected the argument that its holding would
trigger a flood of litigation and stem innovation, especially given the demanding proof
requirements of a Walker Process claim. Id. The Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court had rejected the same flooding argument in Walker Process. Id.
230. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174, 176-77. The first prong makes clear that
invalidity of the patent is insufficient and a showing of intentional fraud in its procurement
is required. The second prong incorporates the rules of antitrust law generally. Ritz Camera
& Image, LLC, 700 F.3d at 506. The Sherman Act provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2
(2006). A monopolization claim has two elements: “(1) the possession of monopoly power
in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power, as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966). “The relevant market is the field in which meaningful competition is said to exist.”
IGT v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 702 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Image
Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997)).
Numerous Walker Process claims fail due to the plaintiff’s failure to identify a pertinent
market or demonstrate the other party’s market power. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust,
Inequitable Conduct, and the Intent to Deceive the Patent Office, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 323,
344 (2011).
231. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
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the Clayton Act, or both.232 Whether conduct in procuring or enforcing a
patent suffices to strip a patentee of its immunity from antitrust laws is
decided under Federal Circuit law, whereas regional circuit law applies to
the other elements of antitrust law (for example, market power).233 State
antitrust law frequently closely tracks the language of the Sherman Act, so
antitrust claims asserted under state statutes in patent infringement cases
are typically analyzed under the same rules and case law applicable to
Sherman Act claims.234 At least one federal court has held that plaintiffs
may assert state law Walker Process-type antitrust claims predicated on
fraudulent conduct before the PTO.235
Walker Process fraud must be pled with particularity under Rule
9(b).236 To plead and prove the first prong (fraud on the PTO), a party
asserting a Walker Process claim must establish each of the following
elements: (1) the patentee obtained a patent by knowingly and willfully
misrepresenting material facts to the PTO (or omitting to state material
facts), (2) the patentee acted with intent to deceive the PTO, (3) the PTO
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation or omission, and (4) the patent
would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission.237
A primary difference between inequitable conduct claims and Walker
Process claims is temporal. Whereas inequitable conduct generally
232. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177-78; 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006). In Southern Snow
Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., Civil Action Nos. 06-9170, 09-3394, 10-0791, 111499, 2013 WL 620266, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2013), a federal district court extended
Walker Process and held that the attempted enforcement of a trademark registration
obtained by fraud can constitute an antitrust violation.
233. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Cornucopia Prods., LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1098 (D. Ariz. 2012)
(“Federal Circuit law now governs the patent-specific portions of [a Walker Process] claim,
while regional circuit law governs the antitrust-specific portion of the claim.”). See also In
re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2332, Master Docket No. 3:12-cv-2389 (PGS), 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126468, at *65 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (noting that that Ritz Camera is
persuasive authority, but not binding on the federal district court).
234. See, e.g., TransWeb LLC v. 3M Innovative Prop. Co., Civil Action No. 10-4413
(FSH), 2011 WL 2181189, at *12 (D.N.J. June 1, 2011) (“Because New Jersey’s antitrust
statutes are construed in harmony with federal antitrust statutes, the Court need not
separately analyze the state law claims.”); Kimberley-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality
Baby Prods., LLC, Civil No. 1:CV-09-1685, 2011 WL 1883815, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Pa. May
17, 2011) (noting that requirements under New York’s Donnelly Act are identical to a
monopolization claim under the Sherman Act); Correct Craft IP Holdings, LLC v. Malibu
Boats, LLC, No. 6:09-cv-813-Orl-28KRS, 2010 WL 598693, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17,
2010) (noting that Florida Antitrust Statutes “closely track the language of the Sherman Act
and are analyzed under the same rules and case law”).
235. In re DDAVP Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 198, 215-19
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
236. TransWeb, 2011 WL 2181189 at *12.
237. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998); accord
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069-70 (applying the same four-factor test).
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concerns conduct and scienter during the patent prosecution process,
Walker Process refers to these elements at the time a patent infringement
action is commenced, which may occur many years after a patent issues.238
A more important distinction concerns proof. Prior to Therasense a
party seeking to establish Walker Process fraud confronted a more onerous
burden than a party seeking to establish inequitable conduct, insofar as
Walker Process fraud required a higher showing of both intent and
materiality.239 Under Walker Process, there must be clear and convincing
evidence of intent to deceive the examiner and thereby cause the PTO to
issue an invalid patent.240 With respect to fraudulent omissions, there must
be evidence of intent separable from the simple fact of the omission.241 The
intent prong, which apparently requires specific intent,242 is difficult to
prove, so the common result is summary judgment in favor of Walker
Process defendants.243 Walker Process fraud also requires but-for
materiality,244 whereas inequitable conduct pre-Therasense did not.
Finally, use of a sliding scale to balance materiality and intent was
authorized by the Federal Circuit pre-Therasense in inequitable conduct
cases,245 whereas no such scale has been approved for use in Walker
238. Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition for Innovation, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 799,
828.
239. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“To
demonstrate Walker Process fraud, a claimant must make higher threshold showings of both
materiality and intent than are required to show inequitable conduct.”); SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-4379 JF (RS), 2008 WL 4615605, at *7 n.8 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 17, 2008) (commenting that the scienter requirement for inequitable conduct is “much
lower” than for Walker Process fraud); Oelke, supra note 96 at *9 (noting the significant
difference pre-Therasense between the levels of materiality and intent required to prove
inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud).
240. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070; Cornucopia Prods., LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 881 F.
Supp. 2d 1086, 1099 (D. Ariz. 2012).
241. Dippin’ Dots, Inc., 476 F.3d at 1347.
242. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that in a Walker Process claim based on attempt to monopolize, “a
specific intent, greater than an intent evidenced by gross negligence or recklessness, is an
indispensable element”); accord Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d
1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting American Hoist’s requirement of specific intent). But
cf. Hydril Co. LP v. Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining
that Walker Process fraud requires “the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of mind so
reckless as to the consequences that it is held to be the equivalent of intent (scienter)”).
243. SanDisk Corp., 2008 WL 4615605 at *7 (“This intent requirement is a high bar that
often results in adjudication in favor of the Walker Process defendant at summary
judgment.”).
244. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1347; accord Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071 (holding
that a party making a Walker Process claim must make “a clear showing of reliance, i.e.,
that the patent would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission”); SanDisk
Corp., 2008 WL 4615605, at *5 (noting that materiality requires a showing that the patent
would not have been issued but for the misrepresentation).
245. See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d at 1363

2014]

INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

399

Process cases.246
The differing burdens meant that pre-Therasense, a finding of
inequitable conduct did not by itself suffice to support a finding of Walker
Process fraud,247 and, conversely, a finding that the patentee did not engage
in inequitable conduct mooted a Walker Process claim.248 In short, Walker
Process fraud could not be found in the absence of inequitable conduct.249
The Federal Circuit has explained the proposition this way: parties in
patent infringement litigation seeking unenforceability on the ground of
inequitable conduct raise a shield, parties seeking antitrust damages raise a
sword,250 and parties break their Walker Process swords when they fail to
first establish inequitable conduct.251
(noting that materiality and culpability are often intertwined; thus, a stronger showing of one
may require less of a showing of the other); see also Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653
F.2d 701, 716 (1st Cir. 1981) (recognizing that materiality and culpability are intertwined).
246. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071.
247. Id. at 1070-71; In re Wellbutrin SR Antitrust Litig., Nos. 04-5525, 05-396, 2010
WL 8425187, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010) (“A showing of inequitable conduct is
therefore insufficient to proceed with a Walker Process fraud claim.”).
248. See, e.g., In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2332, No. 3:12-cv-2389 (PGS),
2013 WL 4780496, at *19-20 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (dismissing Walker Process claims
based on prior finding of no inequitable conduct in underlying patent case); SanDisk Corp.
v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-4379 ZJF (RS), 2009 WL 1404689, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 19, 2009) (“[J]ust as a finding of inequitable conduct may moot SanDisk’s patent
infringement claim, a finding that SanDisk did not engage in equitable conduct may moot
ST’s Walker Process claim . . . .”) (emphasis in original); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Genrad,
Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1141, 1157 (D. Mass. 1995) (“A failure to prove inequitable conduct may
eliminate the need to determine the [Walker Process] antitrust counterclaim.”).
249. See Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro Tech., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 160, 174 (D. Mass.
2011) (“[A] finding of inequitable conduct [is] a prerequisite for a showing of Walker
Process fraud.”); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Continental Datalabel, Inc., No. 10 C 2744, 2010
WL 4932666, at * 4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2010) (“[A] party that fails to prove inequitable
conduct cannot establish a Walker Process violation that is premised on such conduct.”);
Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 030937 (SDW-MCA), 2009 WL 1437815, at *6
(D.N.J. May 19, 2009) (“If a finding of inequitable conduct may be insufficient to meet the
more rigorous standard for Walker Process fraud, it logically follows that Walker Process
fraud cannot be found in the absence of inequitable conduct.”); FMC Corp. v. Manitowac
Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[A] failure to establish inequitable conduct
precludes a determination that [plaintiff] had borne its greater burden of establishing the
fraud required to support its Walker Process claim.”); see also Leslie, supra note 230, at 336
(noting that the Federal Circuit “makes it impossible to prove Walker Process fraud in the
absence of inequitable conduct”).
250. See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070 (“Inequitable conduct is thus an equitable
defense in a patent infringement action and serves as a shield, while a more serious finding
of fraud potentially exposes a patentee to antitrust liability and thus serves as a sword.”);
Korody-Colyer Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 828 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating
that in raising a claim of inequitable conduct, “a party raises a shield,” while in contrast, a
party asserting Walker Process claims “unsheaths a sword”).
251. See FMC Corp., 835 F.2d at 1418 (concluding that when FMC failed to establish
inequitable conduct, it “broke its Walker Process sword”).
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Given the opportunity to moot antitrust claims, courts often conclude
that the goals of convenience, efficiency, judicial economy, and the
avoidance of juror confusion are best served by bifurcating under Rule
42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure252 and deciding the
inequitable conduct defense first, before the antitrust claim is presented to a
jury.253 The Federal Circuit has described the bifurcation for trial of patent
issues and Walker Process issues as “now-standard practice.”254
Bifurcation has also occurred at the discovery stage,255 in recognition of the
substantial expense and burden associated with discovery in antitrust
cases.256
252. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (permitting a court to order separate trials “[f]or
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.”).
253. See, e.g., Seiko Epson Corp. v. E-Babylon, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-896-BR, 2011 WL
5554447, at *2 n.3 (D. Or. Nov. 15, 2011) (noting that the court previously stayed and
bifurcated antitrust aspects of Walker Process claim pending resolution of inequitable
conduct claim); Seiko Epson Corp. v. Glory S. Software Mfg., Inc., No. 06-CV-477-BR,
2010 WL 256505, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 19, 2010) (bifurcating and staying trial of Walker
Process claim in interest of efficiency); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C
04-4379 ZJF (RS), 2009 WL 1404689, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2009) (“[A] finding that
SanDisk did not engage in inequitable conduct may moot ST’s Walker Process claim . . . .
Accordingly, the Court concludes that convenience and judicial economy would be best
served by trying the inequitable conduct defense first.”) (emphasis in original); Squared D
Co. v. E.I. Elec., No. 06 C 5079, 2009 WL 136177, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2009)
(bifurcating inequitable conduct and Walker Process claims); Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Genrad, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1141, 1157 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[C]ourts often separate patent
issues from antitrust counterclaim issues.”).
254. See In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (discussing
23 cases utilizing the “now-standard practice” of bifurcating patent and antitrust issues);
accord U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., No. 89 C 7533, 1994 WL 74989, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1994) (noting “common practice” to bifurcate patent infringement and
antitrust issues).
255. See, e.g., Square D Co., 2009 WL 136177 at *2 (stating that bifurcation of issues
can reduce the enormous expenses associated with discovery in antitrust cases); ChipMender, Inc. v. Sherwin Williams Co., No. C 05-3465 PJH, 2006 WL 13058, at *13 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 3, 2006) (concluding that potential prejudice and other relevant factors necessitate
the bifurcation of issues and stay of discovery); Implant Innovations, Inc. v. Nobelpharma
AB, No. 93 C 7489, 1996 WL 568791, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 1996) (determining that
antitrust claims should be tried separately from patent claims in light of the great expense
involved in antitrust discovery).
256. See DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Systems, Inc., No. 08 CV 1531, 2008 WL 4812440,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2008) (“[D]iscovery in any antitrust case can quickly become
enormously expensive and burdensome to defendants.”) (emphasis in original); Roy W.
Breitenbach & Alicia M. Wilson, Managing the Fact Discovery Tsunami: Tips When
Defending a Federal Antitrust Case, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 2011, at S8 (“In complex antitrust
disputes, the amount of [electronically-stored information] often is so vast, and the
preservation and production issues so complex, that e-discovery issues quickly spin out of
control and destroy the entire defense budget.”); William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the
Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898-99 (2003) (“[C]ourts typically permit antitrust discovery to
range further (and costs to run higher) than in most other cases.”). But cf. Mark Anderson &
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In Therasense the Federal Circuit did not signal that the components
of Walker Process fraud have changed.257 None of the opinions in the en
banc decision even considers the implications of the decision for Walker
Process litigation. But the court’s dramatic revision in Therasense of the
standard for proving inequitable conduct has realigned the doctrine to make
it “virtually congruent with intentional fraud under Walker Process.”258
This realignment has major implications for Walker Process claims. Even
prior to Therasense, successful Walker Process claims were “few and far
between,”259 with many such claims being dismissed on summary judgment
motions.260 Successful antitrust claims post-Therasense will be even rarer.
As noted, Walker Process claims cannot proceed in the absence of
inequitable conduct. Because the combination of Exergen and Therasense
has made it so difficult to plead and prove inequitable conduct, many
defendants who in the past might have been able to prosecute Walker
Process claims will be barred from doing so even though inequitable
Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 18 & n.84 (2010) (noting that a quantitative analysis of discovery
expense in antitrust suits “does not appear to exist in current literature”).
257. TransWeb LLC v. 3M Innovative Prop. Co., No. 10-4413 (FSH), 2011 WL
2181189, at *12 (D.N.J. June 1, 2011) (stating that the Federal Circuit in Therasense failed
to indicate that elements of Walker Process claims had changed in light of its decision).
258. J. Thomas Rosch, Patent Law and Antitrust Law: Neither Friend nor Foe, but
Business Partners, 13 SEDONA CONF. J. 95, 100 (2012); accord Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro
Tech., Inc., No. 08-CV-11187-PBS, 2011 WL 4346852, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 2011)
(“[I]t appears that Walker Process fraud is now largely coextensive with the new inequitable
conduct doctrine.”). One respect in which the doctrines are not entirely congruent concerns
the adoption in Therasense of the egregious misconduct exception to but-for materiality.
See Leslie, supra note 230, at 344 (“Although Therasense has narrowed the definition of
materiality for inequitable conduct, the definition remains broader than materiality for
Walker Process purposes. Walker Process uses true but-for materiality, while Therasense
adopted what may be termed ‘but-for plus’ since ‘affirmative egregious misconduct’ can be
material even if the patent would have otherwise issued.”) (internal citations omitted).
259. Rosch, supra note 258, at 99; see also David R. Steinman & Danielle S.
Fitzpatrick, Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Infringement Cases: A Guide to Walker
Process and Sham-Litigation Claims, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 99 (2001) (calling
Walker Process claims “extremely unsuccessful”). Rare examples of evidence sufficient to
show Walker Process fraud include (1) deleting references to on-point prior art from a
patent application with no adequate explanation, Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations,
Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1062, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1989); (2) failing to include prior art known to
the patent applicant through multiple personal demonstrations of that art, Unitherm Food
Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d on other
grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006); and (3) failing to include a full translation of a foreign patent
where that patent was the only document in the initial application that, if fully understood by
the patent examiner, would have resulted in a denial of the application. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009).
260. Paul D. Swanson, The Patent Legal Malpractice Implications of ‘Walker Process’
Antitrust Claims, PATENT PRACTICE PROF’L LIAB. REP. (Mar. 5, 2013), available at
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-patent-legal-malpractice-implication-94471/.
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conduct claims are more likely to provide a sound basis for Walker Process
claims than ever before.261 The Walker Process standard has not changed,
but the hurdles for advancing to the antitrust phase of bifurcated patent
litigation have been raised even higher.262
The expected reduction in Walker Process litigation is likely to further
reduce the incentive for patent applicants to make full disclosure to the
PTO and may invite fraud. The minimized prospect of facing an award of
treble damages under the Clayton Act may encourage applicant fraud by
rendering misconduct before the PTO cost-beneficial.263
The virtual alignment of inequitable conduct and Walker Process
fraud that was accomplished by Therasense also increases the likelihood
that the Seventh Amendment264 right of Walker Process claimants to have
their antitrust claims tried by a jury will be infringed. Parties asserting
antitrust claims have an undisputed right to a jury trial,265 but parties
asserting a defense or affirmative claim of inequitable conduct have no
Seventh Amendment right, because the latter assertions seek relief pursuant
to the court’s equitable powers.266 Complications arise when bifurcation
occurs. Rule 42(b) expressly instructs that a court considering bifurcation

261. See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 79, at 250 (describing the requirements
for establishing inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud).
262. Cf. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Patent Exclusions and Antitrust After Therasense 29
(Univ. of Iowa Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 11-39, Dec. 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916074 (arguing that Walker Process actions should be permitted
to proceed where there is no inequitable conduct as Therasense defines it, but evidence of
prior art later emerges).
263. Stijepko Tokic, Enforcing the Duty of Disclosure after Therasense: Antitrust
Implications, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 221, 258 (2012) (arguing that Therasense seriously reduces the
likelihood of a consumer antitrust action and recovery because of a significantly higher
burden of proving inequitable conduct).
264. The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
265. See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (“[T]he right to a
trial by jury applies to treble damages under the antitrust laws . . . .”).
266. See Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“Inequitable conduct is equitable in nature, with no right to a jury . . . .”); Cabinet
Vision v. Cabnetware, 129 F.3d 595, 599 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[Appellee Cabnetware’s]
affirmative defense of inequitable conduct seeks relief by way of the court’s equitable
powers; it is not a suit at common law and therefore cannot alone entitle the parties to a jury
trial.”); Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1204 (E.D.
Cal. 2011) (“The Seventh Amendment jury trial right does not attach to claims based in
equity, such as the defense of inequitable conduct.”); T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of
Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 REV. OF LITIG. 377, 412-18 (2008)
(noting that a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial “only when there are common issues of fact
material to the disposition of both law and equity”).
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must always preserve inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the
United States.267 If inequitable conduct and antitrust issues are bifurcated,
an initial bench determination that inequitable conduct did not occur may
operate to preclude a subsequent jury trial on a Walker Process antitrust
claim and thus violate the Seventh Amendment.
Prior to Therasense, at least one federal district court acknowledged
the Seventh Amendment issue and refused to bifurcate inequitable conduct
and Walker Process claims.268 But many other pre-Therasense courts chose
to ignore the issue and granted bifurcation requests.269 Although it is
unclear why the issue was routinely ignored, courts (and litigators) may
have assumed that a bench determination that no inequitable conduct
occurred necessarily meant that no reasonable jury could find that Walker
Process fraud occurred, given the more stringent requirements of the
antitrust claim.270
The Seventh Amendment issue is likely to loom even larger postTherasense, following the virtual alignment of the standards for proving
inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud.271 This realignment makes
it increasingly likely that Walker Process claimants will be deprived of
trials, because significantly fewer inequitable conduct claims will survive.
The court explained in Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro Technology, Inc.272 in
2011 that “[i]f a judge’s determination of no inequitable conduct precluded
a jury from later finding Walker Process fraud as a matter of law, then a
viable argument could be made that the doctrines would collide with the
protections afforded Walker Process claimants by the Seventh
Amendment.”273
267. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
268. See Celgene Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 07-286 (SDW), 2008 WL 2447354, at
*3 (D.N.J. June 13, 2008) (refusing to bifurcate because bifurcation could violate the
constitutional right to trial by jury). Cf. Implant Innovations, Inc. v. Nobelpharma AB, No.
93 C 7489, 1996 WL 568791, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 1996) (concluding that a prior
determination by the court of the inequitable conduct aspect of the patent claim would
violate the Seventh Amendment, and ordering jury trial for both inequitable conduct and
antitrust issues).
269. Asim M. Bhansali & William S. Hicks, Trial Management after Therasense:
Inequitable Conduct, Walker Process Fraud, and the Seventh Amendment, 21 (No. 2)
COMPETITION 1, 6 (2012) (“[R]equests to bifurcate and stay Walker Process claims were
often granted in the pre-Therasense era without any consideration of Seventh Amendment
issues.”). Some courts have ordered trifurcation. See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v.
Comfortex Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 145, 155 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
270. Bhansali & Hicks, supra note 269, at 21.
271. Id. at 8 (noting that alignment of inequitable conduct and Walker Process standards
“has highlighted Seventh Amendment concerns arising from bifurcation that existed even
before Therasense”).
272. 882 F. Supp. 2d 160 (D. Mass. 2011).
273. Id. at 175. See also SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-4379 ZJF
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In summary, Therasense will constrict the availability of the
inequitable conduct defense, and the new congruence of the standards for
inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud is likely to simultaneously
constrict the availability of the antitrust claim and infringe the Seventh
Amendment jury trial rights of Walker Process litigants.
III.

AMERICA INVENTS ACT

Congress enacted the AIA several months after the Federal Circuit
issued its en banc decision in Therasense. The AIA, signed into law on
September 16, 2011 and fully in effect in March 2013, is the most
significant revision to the U.S. patent regime since the 1952 enactment of
the Patent Act, which recodified the entirety of U.S. patent law.274 The
AIA may be the most significant change to U.S. patent laws since the 1836
Patent Act, which established the modern American system of patent
examination.
The AIA was the culmination of efforts to reform the U.S. patent
system that had been under way since the early 2000s. The first version of
what became the AIA was introduced in June 2005 and subsequent
versions were introduced in the following years.275 The failure of these
early efforts resulted in frequent intervention by the Federal Circuit and
Supreme Court to resolve significant patent issues. In addition to Exergen
in 2009 and Therasense in 2011, the intervention encompassed the Federal
Circuit decision in In re Seagate Technology, LLC in 2007 (raising the
standard for finding willful patent infringement),276 as well as Supreme
Court decisions reformulating the standards for non-obviousness,277
(RS), 2009 WL 1404689, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2009) (“When a jury decides the Walker
Process fraud, the Seventh Amendment constrains a court’s determination of inequitable
conduct.”); Gordon & Stack, supra note 43, at 91 (2011) (“Therasense may also
bolster the argument that infringement defendants have a constitutional right to a jury trial
on factual issues that are common to an inequitable conduct defense and a Walker Process
claim . . . . To the extent that the underlying elements of proof are now identical, Therasense
may strengthen the argument . . . .”)
274. See Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, In Memoriam Best Mode, 64 STAN. L.
REV.
ONLINE
125,
125
(2012),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/64-SLRO-125.pdf
(describing the AIA as “the most substantial legislative overhaul of patent law and practice
in more than half a century.”); PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3
(Sept.
2012),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/2012-patentlitigation-study.jhtml (“Last year marked the most significant change to the US patent
system in almost 60 years.”).
275. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 435-512 (2011-12) (describing the development of the LeahySmith America Invents Act).
276. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
277. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419-22 (2007) (rejecting Federal
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injunctive relief,278 patent exhaustion,279 and patent invalidity.280
While the AIA does not expressly address inequitable conduct, several
of the statute’s provisions may operate to significantly restrict use of the
defense. These provisions relate to post-issuance review and the best mode
of using the invention. Both changes are discussed below, along with their
adverse implications for the inequitable conduct defense.
A. Post-Issuance Review
The first set of AIA provisions affecting inequitable conduct pertains
to post-issuance review. These provisions include post-grant review
(PGR), inter partes review (IPR), and supplemental examination.
1.

Background

The proceedings available after the grant of a patent are conducted
through the PTO to reconsider issued patents and can result in
confirmation, cancellation, withdrawal, or modification of patent claims.
Prior to passage of the AIA, the only post-issuance review options were ex
parte reexamination (adopted in 1980)281 and inter partes reexamination
(adopted in 1999).282 The former option constituted the first non-judicial
proceeding enabling a third party to challenge the validity of a patent.283 Ex
parte reexamination is available for any patent during the period of its
enforceability, which is typically the term of the patent plus six years
(representing the statute of limitations for bringing an enforcement
action).284 In both ex parte reexamination and inter partes reexamination
the PTO Director could order a reexamination after a requester raised a
substantial new question (SNQ) of patentability for any of the claims of the
Circuit’s rigid application of obviousness standard).
278. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390-94 (2006) (holding that
four-factor test traditionally employed by equity courts in deciding whether to award
permanent injunctive relief applies in patent litigation).
279. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 617-38 (2008) (holding
that exhaustion doctrine applies to method patents).
280. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2238-54 (2011)
(reinforcing use of clear and convincing standard for proving patent invalidity).
281. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, ch. 30, § 302, 94 Stat. 3015 (listing
requirements for requesting reexamination).
282. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, tit. IV, 113 Stat.
1501A-0552, at sec. 4601 (explaining the inter partes reexamination procedure).
283. Jeffrey P. Kushan, The Fruits of the Convoluted Road to Patent Reform: The New
Invalidity Proceedings of the Patent and Trademark Office, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385,
391 (2012).
284. See 37 C.F.R. §1.501(a) (2012) (defining the period in which citations of prior art
may be filed); 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012) (setting forth applicable statute of limitations).
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patent for which it sought reexamination.285 This amorphous standard
borrowed from the reasonable examiner standard used intermittently for
many years to determine materiality under Rule 56.286 The ambiguity
contributed to rubber-stamping of requests. Approximately ninety-two
percent of ex parte reexamination requests and ninety-four percent of inter
partes reexamination requests were granted through June 2012.287 The
Director’s determination of a SNQ was final and non-appealable.288
The two review options have been criticized for multiple reasons. The
first is lack of timeliness and resulting uncertainty.
Ex parte
reexaminations take an average of two years and pre-AIA the average
pendency of an inter partes reexamination was more than three years.289 A
second objection is perceived bias.290 Patent owners had no right to initiate
inter partes examination, whereas both owners and third-parties can
request ex parte reexamination. In recent years approximately ninety
percent of ex parte reexamination requests were filed by third parties,291 but
285. 35 U.S.C. §§ 303(a) (2012) (“Within three months following the filing of a request
for reexamination under the provisions of section 302 of this title, the Director will
determine whether a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the
patent concerned is raised by the request.”).
286. Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Laws, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 48 (1997) (discussing
the application of the reasonable examiner standard).
287. EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA – JUNE 30, 2012, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK
OFFICE
1
(2012),
available
at
assets.sbnation.com/assets/1619547/Ex_parte_reexam_stats.pdf [hereinafter USPTO EX
PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA]; INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA – JUNE
30, 2012, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 1 (2012), available at
http://ptolitigationcenter.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/02/IP_quarterly_report_June_30_2012.pdf [hereinafter USPTO INTER
PARTES REEXMINATION FILING DATA].
288. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 312; Heinl v. Godici, 143 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596-98 (E.D. Va.
2001) (stating that reexamination is an intermediate or preliminary decision, not final
agency action, and therefore not ordinarily subject to judicial review).
289. Andrei Iancu & Ben Haber, Post-Issuance Proceedings in the America Invents Act,
93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 476, 477 (2011). Cf. Harkins, supra note 69, at *6
(“[I]nter partes reexaminations typically took three to five years.”); Eric J. Rogers, Ten
Years of Inter Partes Patent Reexamination Appeals: An Empirical View, 29 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 305, 352 (2013) (noting that the mean pendency of completed
inter partes reexaminations is 4.9 years). Even these statistics are not a true reflection of the
average pendency of inter partes reexaminations, because they only include those that were
completed.
290. See Kushan, supra note 283, at 391 (“[F]rom its inception, the ex parte
reexamination proceeding has been seen as biased in favor of the patent owner.”); accord
Sherry M. Knowles, Thomas E. Vanderbloemen & Charles E. Peeler, Inter Partes Patent
Reexamination in the United States, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 612 (2004)
(explaining that procedural benefits in reexamination procedures favor the patent owner).
291. Dennis Crouch, A Rush to File Ex Parte Reexaminations and Now a Lull,
PATENTLY-O (Nov. 4, 2012, 7:03 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/11/a-rush-to-
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the requester does not participate in such proceedings unless she is the
patentee. The third party’s nominal role is limited to presenting a
substantial new question of patentability to the PTO for resolution. If
reexamination is granted the third-party’s involvement terminates. This
defect is magnified by the PTO’s susceptibility to “well-recognized
externalities that favor sustaining patent claims.”292 In addition, until a few
years ago it was common practice for the same examiner who originally
issued the patent to be assigned to the ex parte reexamination.293 Not
surprisingly then, during the period from July 1981 through June 2012, all
claims were canceled in ex parte reexaminations only eleven percent of the
time.294 By comparison, during the period from November 1999 to June
2012, all claims were canceled (or disclaimed) in inter partes
reexaminations forty-two percent of the time.295
Another common criticism is that both options were limited in scope.
Inter partes reexamination allowed challenges only on grounds of novelty
or non-obviousness,296 and in both proceedings only patents and printed
publications could be used to contest the patent.297 This is a limiting factor

file-ex-parte-reexaminations-and-now-a-lull.html (stating that around ninety percent of ex
parte reexamination requests are filed by third-parties); see also Joseph R. Re, “Parallel
Prosecution”: Effect of Patent Prosecution on Concurrent Litigation, 73 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 965, 967-68 (1991) (noting that patentees initiate some
reexaminations, primarily to strengthen and confirm the validity of their own patents prior to
commencing enforcement litigation).
292. Jason Rantanen, Lee Petherbridge & Jay P. Kesan, America Invents, More or
Less?,
160
U.
PA.
L.
REV.
PENNUMBRA
229,
243
(2012),
http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/160-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-229.pdf. See also
Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 478 (2011) (“[T]he PTO’s salary and
bonus system is structured in such a way as to incentivize examiners to grant rather than
deny patents.”).
293. NANCY J. LINCK, BRUCE H. STONER, LEE E. BARRETT & CAROL A. SPIEGEL, POSTGRANT PATENT PRACTICE 6 (2012).
294. USPTO EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 287, at 2.
295. USPTO INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 287. This
percentage, while high, does not necessarily reveal success by third-party requesters,
because the cancellation of patent claims might be irrelevant to infringement accusations
against the requester. Rogers, supra note 289, at 347 (explaining that the cancellation
and/or amendment of patent claims resulting from the proceeding might be immaterial to
accusations of patent infringement raised); see also LINCK, STONER, BARRETT & SPIEGEL,
supra note 293, at 7 (“Based on these statistics, one may reasonably conclude that the
patent owner fares better in ex parte reexamination than in inter partes reexamination, at
least in part due to the lack of third party participation.”).
296. Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the
America Invents Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 113-14 (2011) (arguing that one limitation
of inter partes reexamination is that it allows challenges only on grounds of novelty or
nonobviousness).
297. Kushan, supra note 283, at 392, 394 (explaining that only patents and printed
publications, and not other types of evidence, can be used to contest the patent).
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because an argument of invalidity often is based on unprinted prior art.298
Finally, inter partes reexaminations were subject to strong estoppel
provisions that operated as a major disincentive to utilize the proceedings,
especially in conjunction with the inability of a third-party requester to
cross-examine the patentee.299
The foregoing disadvantages, primarily imposed on third-party
challengers, collectively explain the limited use of the proceedings.300
Nearly 4,500 patents are issued every week, whereas ex parte
reexamination has applied, on average, to only 380 patents per year301 and
the PTO received only 1,659 requests for inter partes reexamination from
November 1999 to June 2012.302
The pre-AIA regime of post-issuance review has been substantially
modified with the introduction of multiple new procedures designed to
minimize litigation costs and increase certainty. The new procedures took
effect on September 16, 2012, one year from the date of enactment of the
AIA. Ex parte reexamination procedures remain virtually unchanged,
despite their various defects,303 but their importance has diminished
compared to the new post-issuance patent review proceedings (post-grant
review and supplemental examination) described below. In addition, inter
298. Rogers, supra note 289, at 350 (“Patent reexams are limited in scope by SNQ’s
implicating only §§ 102 and 103, when much of patent claim invalidity argued during
litigation involves §§ 112 and 102 that are based on unprinted, prior art.”).
299. See REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK
OFFICE
(2004),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexam_report.htm; Kushan, supra
note 283, at 394; Carrier, supra note 296, at 114 (“[I]nter partes reexamination is burdened
by two strong estoppel provisions. One prevents a requester from challenging the validity
of any fact determined in the examination. The other prohibits a requester from later
asserting the invalidity of a patent on any ground that it raised or could have raised.”)
(internal quotations omitted); Rogers, supra note 289, at 322 (noting that ex parte
reexaminations are not subject to these strong estoppel effects).
300. See Masur, supra note 292, at 481 (noting that inter partes reexamination “imposes
such disadvantages on third-party challengers that it is almost never used”).
301. Carrier, supra note 296, at 113.
302. USPTO INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 287, at 1. The
use of inter partes reexamination accelerated in recent years. During the fiscal years 2000
to 2004, the PTO received a total of 53 inter partes reexamination filings. During the fiscal
years 2008 to 2012, the PTO received more than 1,350 such filings. Id.
303. See Stefan Blum, Note, Ex Parte Reexamination: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, 73
OHIO STATE L.J. 395, 433 (2012) (noting that ex parte reexamination is “essentially intact”
under the AIA). The major change was a substantial increase in fees in September 2012.
Crouch, supra note 291 (noting a substantial increase in fees in September 2012). Fees
were later reduced in March 2013. The fee for requesting an ex parte reexamination
decreased from $17,750 to $12,000. Fees for supplemental examinations, petitioning for
IPR, and petitioning for PGR also declined, as did standard fees for micro-entities. See
Dennis Crouch, USPTO Fee Changes on March 19, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 18, 2013; 9:15
AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/uspto-fee-change-on-march-19.html.

2014]

INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

409

partes reexamination has been substantially altered and re-designated as
“inter partes review.” PGR and IPR have become the primary vehicles for
litigating patentability at the PTO. Each of the foregoing proceedings is
examined below.
2.

Post-Grant Review

Under the AIA’s new first-to-file rules, post-grant review can be
requested by any person who is not the owner of the patent no later than
nine months following the grant of a patent or re-issuance of a patent issued
from applications filed after March 16, 2013.304 Given that in the 2012
fiscal year it took an average of 32.4 months for a patent application to
issue as a patent or be abandoned,305 PGR might not be commonly used
before 2016 or 2017.
A petitioner may request to cancel as unpatentable one or more claims
of a patent on any ground for invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 282, any
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (except for failure to disclose the best
mode), and any requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 251. PGR thus permits attacks
based on, inter alia, invalidating prior art, prior public use, lack of
enablement, lack of written description, lack of utility, lack of obviousness,
lack of novelty, or prior sale or offer for sale.306 This is a considerably
broader array of grounds than is available to challenge patents in
reexaminations.
Formerly, a party seeking inter partes reexamination was required to
show that cited prior art raised a SNQ of patentability. Under the AIA, a
petition for PGR may be granted if (1) the information therein, if
unrebutted, makes it “more likely than not that at least one of the claims
challenged in the petition is unpatentable,”307 or (2) “the petition raises a
novel or unsettled legal questions that is important to other patents or
applications.”308 It is unclear what constitutes such a question and whether
petitioner must establish that at least one claim is unpatentable if such a
question exists.
304. 35 U.S.C. § 321(a), (c) (2011). For more than 200 years the United States gave
priority of right to those who were first in time to an invention. The AIA changed that
tradition and replaced it with a general rule under which patent rights are awarded to the
first inventor to file a patent application. See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2011) (defining the first
inventor to file rule).
305. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability
Report FY 2012, supra note 76, at 14 (showing patent application average pendency to be
32.4 months).
306. Robert Greene Sterne, et al., America Invents Act: The 5 New Post-Issuance
Procedures, 13 SEDONA CONF. L.J. 27, 32 (2012) [hereinafter 5 Procedures].
307. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2012).
308. 35 U.S.C. § 324(b) (2012).
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On its face, the new PGR standard is higher than the SNQ previously
required for initiating an inter partes reexamination. But once initiated, the
preponderance of evidence standard will be used to determine the
patentability of claims, as it is in ex parte reexaminations. Accordingly, a
petitioner seeking PGR will ultimately confront the same burden to prove
that a claim is invalid as petitioners previously did in inter partes
reexaminations.
A party may seek PGR (or IPR) or instead opt to sue in district court,
but neither PTO proceeding may be instituted by a party or a party’s real
party in interest if that entity previously contested the validity of a claim of
the patent in civil litigation.309 The PTO’s decision whether to open a PGR
is final and non-appealable.310 PGRs are adjudicated by three-judge panels
of the new Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB),311 which replaced the
back-logged Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) within the
PTO.312
Pre-AIA, inter partes reexamination had no discovery component,313
but PGR and IPR both permit limited discovery with poorly defined
boundaries. Discovery in both PGR and IPR is narrower than discovery in

309. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), 325(a)(1) (2012). The filing of a counterclaim of
invalidity in an action commenced by the patent owner does not constitute a civil action
challenging the validity of a claim of a patent. §§ 315(a)(3), 325(a)(3) (2012).
310. Versata Dev. Corp. v. Rea, No. 1:13-cv-328 (GBL/IDD), 2013 WL 4014649, at *5
(E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2013) (holding that court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because “the
AIA expressly precludes judicial review of the decision to institute post-grant review”).
311. 35 U.S.C. § 326(c) (2012); MATTHEW A. SMITH, INTER PARTES REVOCATION
PROCEEDINGS § 14:1 (2012) (stating that a panel of three judges generally conducts a postgrant review). The PTAB’s membership includes the Director, the Deputy Director, the
Commissioner for Patents, the Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative law
judges. Karen A. Lorang, The Unintended Consequences of Post-Grant Review of Patents,
17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2013).
312. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (“Any reference in any Federal law, executive order, rule,
regulation, or delegation of authority, or any document of or pertaining to the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences is deemed to refer to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.”);
see also Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Pending Appeals Not Impacted by BPAI ->
PTAB
Transformation,
PATENTLY-O
(Sept.
16,
2012,
10:34
AM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/pending-appeals-not-impacted-by-bpai-ptabtransformation.html (explaining that the name change from BPAI to PTAB would have no
effect on the pending ex parte appeals before the Board). The BPAI’s backlog of pending
appeals increased from 1,357 in 2006 to 22,356 in 2011, an increase of more than 1,600
percent in five years. Rogers, supra note 289, at 351. By May 2013, the backlog exceeded
25,000 cases, even following a significant reduction. Dennis Crouch, Slow and Steady:
PTAB Continuing to Address Backlog of Ex Parte Appeals, PATENTLY-O (May 1, 2013, 2:16
PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/slow-and-steady-ptab-continuing-toaddress-backlog-of-ex-parte-appeals.html.
313. See Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (affirming
grant of motion to quash two subpoenas duces tecum for use in inter partes reexamination
proceeding).
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federal district court, and discovery in IPR is narrower than it is in PGR. In
post-grant review the parties may take discovery directly related to factual
assertions advanced by either party,314 whereas discovery in inter partes
review is limited to depositions of witnesses who submitted affidavits or
declarations and what is “otherwise necessary in the interest of justice.”315
PGR’s broader discovery is appropriate, because the grounds for
challenging a patent are more substantial in PGR than in IPR.
The new materiality standard established in Therasense may affect
inequitable conduct allegations that a patent challenger considers asserting
in an infringement action filed after an inter partes review (or IPR). For
example, a PGR that invalidates “some but not all claims may be used to
prove the materiality of a reference that was not cited in the original
prosecution of a patent.”316 How often will this occur? Pre-AIA
approximately one percent of patents were litigated317 and litigation often
proceeded concurrently with PTO proceedings. Approximately seventy
percent of patents in inter partes reexamination and thirty-three percent of
patents in ex parte reexaminations also were in district court litigation,318
even though the proceedings were designed to be an alternative to
litigation. Post-grant review presents the potential to shift numerous patent
validity disputes from the federal courts to the PTO, given the opportunity
to challenge a patent based on any invalidity theory, a lower standard of
proof, the absence of any presumption of validity, and the fact that PGR
may be much quicker than litigation.319 Whereas the AIA provides for
PGRs (and IPRs) to be decided by the PTAB within twelve months from
314. 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(5) (2012).
315. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) (2012). The PTAB has outlined a five-factor analysis that it
will use to determine whether to allow additional discovery that is otherwise necessary in
the interest of justice. See Dennis Crouch, Discovery Process in Post-Grant Proceedings,
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 22, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/abbottcordis-pgr.html. See also 5 Procedures, supra note 306, at 41 (predicting, on the basis of
historical interference practice, that the “otherwise necessary” option “will provide little, if
any, avenue to obtain discovery”).
316. Eric S. Walter & Colette R. Verkuil, Patent Litigation Strategy: The Impact of the
America Invents Act and the New Post-Grant Patent Procedures 6, MORRISON & FOERSTER
(2012), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120307-Patent-LitigationStrategy.pdf.
317. Rantanen, Petherbridge & Kesan, supra note 292, at 229. The number of patent
actions commenced in federal district court reached 4,015 in 2011 – the highest number of
annual filings ever recorded. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 274, at 6.
318. LINCK, STONER, BARRETT & SPIEGEL, supra note 293, at ix; Rogers, supra note 289,
at 319 (noting that reexamination “has become an integral part of patent litigation strategy”).
319. Justin A. Hendrix & Robert F. Shaffer, POST GRANT PROCEEDINGS OF THE AIA
PROVIDE NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND REQUIRE RECONSIDERATION OF OLD PATENT LITIGATION
STRATEGIES,
Finnegan
(June
15,
2012),
available
at
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=598696f7-7eba-4fcb83b8-2369caa91dd3.
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institution of the proceedings (with the possibility of an additional sixmonth extension for good cause),320 the median time to trial in patent
litigation remained steady at approximately two and a half years during the
period from 2005 to 2011.321
Notwithstanding the foregoing, PGR is unlikely to be widely used,
given the high cost of analyzing potential threats from thousands of
patents.322 More likely, such review will be used in targeted fashion by
companies focusing on emerging patent portfolios of strategic competitors.
The nine-month window for seeking PGR also is likely to restrict the use of
review as a non-litigation option, particularly for small- and medium-size
businesses that lack the infrastructure necessary to monitor the issuance of
competitors’ patents.323
Perhaps the greatest disincentive to frequent use of post-grant review
may be provided by its robust estoppel effect. The AIA requires the PTAB
to issue a final written decision concerning the patentability of any patent
claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added during PGR. 324
Issuance by the PTAB triggers PGR’s estoppel effect. If the decision is
adverse to the petitioner, she is estopped from asserting invalidity before
the PTO, International Trade Commission (ITC), or a federal court on any
basis that was raised or reasonably could have been raised during the
PGR.325 This differs considerably from the estoppel effect attaching to
inter partes reexamination pre-AIA, which followed exhaustion of all
appeals. Under the AIA, estoppel is attainable within twelve to eighteen
months, in contrast with the approximately six years an appeal from an
inter partes reexamination took to make its way through the PTO and

320. 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11), (c) (2012).
321. PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 206, at 21; cf. Barney, supra note 26, at *1
(predicting that AIA will result in “many more post-grant review challenges” in the PTO,
but not necessarily a corresponding reduction in federal court litigation).
322. One projection of the average cost for PGR/IPR is $150,000 to $300,000 per party,
“an order of magnitude less expensive than district court litigation.” Matthew Cutler, Inter
Partes Review and Post Grant Review are Game-Changers, IP LAW360 (Jan. 8, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/402322/why-inter-partes-and-post-grant-review-are-gamechangers; see also Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV.
41, 57 (2012) (observing that inter partes reexamination costs substantially less than
litigation); Rogers, supra note 289, at 355-56 (comparing predicted cost of IPR of $600,000
to average cost of patent litigation of $6 million per side).
323. See Hung H. Bui, An Overview of Patent Reform Act of 2011: Navigating the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Including Effective Dates for Patent Reform, 93 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441 (2011) (predicting that nine-month window will operate to
limit use of PGR); Rantanen, Petherbridge & Kesan, supra note 292, at 229 (arguing that for
many small businesses and inventors, PGR “will operate more as a patent system-use tax,
adding to the cost and complexity of obtaining an enforceable patent”).
324. 35 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2012).
325. 35 U.S.C. § 325(e) (2012).
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obtain a final opinion from the Federal Circuit.326 No doubt the speed with
which estoppel takes effect will weigh heavily in the decision calculus
concerning pursuit of PGR (or IPR). Adverse final PGR decisions estop
petitioners, real parties in interest, or privies of the petitioner. They do not
estop patent owners. This uneven application of estoppel is likely to
dissuade prospective petitioners from regarding PGR as an attractive
substitute for litigation.327
The AIA’s robust estoppel effect also is present in IPR, but it could be
particularly acute in PGR328 where the grounds on which a petitioner may
assert invalidity are unrestricted and there is no exemption from the scope
of estoppel for newly discovered prior art. The lack of restriction offers
significant opportunities to find that a basis for invalidity either was raised
or reasonably could have been raised, thereby triggering the estoppel effect.
This broad estoppel is likely to operate as a significant deterrent to the use
of PGR by petitioners, except where the facts supporting invalidity are very
strong.
As discussed below, the AIA’s new supplemental examination
procedure offers a major opportunity for patentees to prevent prior art
references or other information from being used as the basis for subsequent
allegations of inequitable conduct. This opportunity makes it likely that
patent owners will seek supplemental examination of patents for prior art
references cited in PGR or IPR, in order to immunize the patents from
exposure to later charges of inequitable conduct if that information was
used by the PTAB to invalidate.329
3.

Inter Partes Review

The AIA’s new inter partes reviews will permit few if any occasions
to bolster or assert an inequitable conduct defense. IPR replaced inter
partes reexamination on September 16, 2012, and applies to patents issued
before, on or after that date—not merely those patents issued on or after
November 29, 1999, as in the case of inter partes reexamination. There are
other important differences between the two procedures. IPR allows the
326. Phillippe Signore, Steve Kunin & Jonathan Parthum, Practice Implications of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, WESTLAW J. EXPERT COMMENT SERIES, PATENTS IN THE
21ST CENTURY: THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT, 2012, at 28, 30, available at
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120206-Patents-21st-Century.pdf.
327. Sandip H. Patel, A Lop-Sided Estoppel in Post-Grant Review, LAW360 (Dec. 21,
2011, 12:28 PM), http://www.marshallip.com/media/pnc/2/media.502.pdf.
328. See Kayla Fossen, Note, The Post-Grant Problem: America Invents Falling Short,
14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 573, 593 (2013) (noting that robust estoppel effect of PGR may
reduce overall use of the procedure); Walters & Verkuil, supra note 316, at 4 (“Post-grant
review carries a greater potential likelihood for estoppel than inter partes review.”).
329. Walters & Verkuil, supra note 316, at 6.
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patentee to respond to the petition and explain why the review should not
proceed, whereas in inter partes reexamination a response by the patentee
was only allowed after the examiner instituted reexamination. Further,
unlike inter partes reexamination, a petition for IPR may not be filed until
nine months after the grant of a patent or issuance of a reissue patent330 or
after termination of a PGR, whichever happens later.331 Inter partes review
thus is available to requesters seeking to challenge the validity of a patent
after the nine-month window for filing post-grant review has closed.
Inter partes review introduces a new standard to commence review
that replaces the former SNQ standard. This standard also differs from the
new test applicable in PGRs. The presentation of a novel or unsettled legal
question is not a valid ground for granting IPR. Rather, the petitioner must
show that the information presented in her petition, together with any
response from the patentee, establishes “that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of
the claims challenged in the petition.”332 Another difference between IPR
and PGR is that in the former, a patent may only be challenged on the
ground that it lacks novelty in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 102 or that it was
obvious in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 103, and only on the basis of prior art
patents and printed publications.333
As in the case of PGR, the PTO’s decision whether to open an inter
partes review is final and non-appealable. It is unclear whether the
petitioner can request that the Director review the PTO’s denial of an IPR,
and what recourse, if any, the petitioner has if IPR is granted for some, but
not all, claims. IPRs are adjudicated by three-judge panels of the new
PTAB.334 As noted, discovery is available,335 but it tends to significantly
favor patentees, insofar as they generally receive priority and are able to
conduct discovery even before they file their responses to petitioners. This
serves to makes the strong estoppel provisions of IPR even stronger.
Estoppel is triggered by the final written decision of the PTAB and applies
to all issues that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in the

330. Reissue provides a second opportunity for a patentee to have the PTO examine a
patent on all the same statutory bases that were or might have been employed during the
original examination. A reissue application is the vehicle for conducting this second
examination. LINCK, STONER, BARRETT & SPIEGEL, supra note 293, at 22.
331. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c) (2012).
332. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). It is unclear what it means to “prevail” in this context.
It could mean that at least one claim is rejected. Alternatively, it could refer to cancellation
or substantial amendment.
333. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
334. Eldora L. Ellison, Patent Reform is on the Immediate Horizon – New Options for
Challenging Patents Before the USPTO (Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox P.L.L.C.), June 27,
2011, at 1, available at skgf.com/media/pnc/3/media.1373.pdf.
335. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) (2012).
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review.336 Given the availability of discovery, it would not be difficult to
successfully maintain that a broad range of issues could have been raised.337
As with PGR, the robust estoppel effect applies to other proceedings in the
PTO, as well as civil actions and proceedings before the ITC.338
PTAB decisions are appealable directly to the Federal Circuit. The
losing party in an IPR cannot return “to the PTO for any proceeding,
including ex parte reexamination and PGR.”339 Prior to enactment of the
AIA, litigation did not preclude inter partes reexamination and, absent a
discretionary stay, the proceedings could advance in tandem. Inter partes
reexaminations were used by parties to create a record to support their
stances in ongoing litigation. For example, litigants would use the
procedure to develop a defense to a claim of inequitable conduct.340 The
situation is different now. It may be more difficult to obtain IPR than it
was to obtain inter partes reexamination pre-AIA, because the standard for
obtaining review has changed. The prior SNQ standard was met in ninetyfour percent of inter partes reexamination requests.341 The new standard
may yield a lower percentage.
There are at least two other limiting factors. First, IPR is unavailable
where there is litigation concerning the patent and either more than one
year has passed since the petitioner (or someone in privity with the
petitioner) was served with the patent infringement complaint342 or the
petitioner filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the
patent before filing the petition for IPR.343 Second, the PTO Director has
the authority to impose a limit on the number of IPRs that may be instituted
during each of the first four years of implementation. This limit had been
projected at 270.344 Inter partes reexamination was rare pre-AIA. IPR may
be even rarer,345 thus further restricting the option to litigants to bolster

336. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012).
337. Andrei Iancu, Ben Haber & Elizabeth Iglesias, Challenging Validity of Issued
Patents before the PTO: Inter Partes Reexam Now or Inter Partes Review Later?, 94 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 148, 155 (2012) [hereinafter Now or Later].
338. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012).
339. Now or Later, supra note 337, at 153.
340. Ben M. Davidson, Reexamining Reexaminations, 34 L.A. LAW. 26, 29 (2012).
341. USPTO Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, supra note 279, at 1.
342. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012).
343. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) (2012); Iancu & Haber, supra note 289, at 476.
344. 5 Procedures, supra note 306, at 37.
345. IPR ultimately may be more rare, but early statistics do not necessarily support
such a projection. Between September 2012 and December 2013 the PTO received 766
filings under the AIA’s new IPR provisions. See AIA Statistics: Inter Partes Review, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/statistics.jsp (last
visited Feb. 22, 2014). In contrast, the PTO received 1,659 inter partes reexamination
filings during the period November 1999 to June 2012. See text accompaning supra note
303.
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their inequitable conduct defenses.
4.

Supplemental Examination

The AIA’s new supplemental examination provisions are very likely
to restrict the inequitable conduct defense as well. Indeed, supplemental
examination has been described as “the AIA’s cure for the ‘plague’ of
inequitable conduct.”346 Under the new procedures, “[a] patent owner may
request supplemental examination of a patent” any time after its issuance
“to consider, reconsider or correct information believed to be relevant to
the patent.”347 The new provisions, set forth in amended 35 U.S.C. § 257
(Section 12 of the AIA), took effect in September 2012,348 apply to any
patent regardless of issue date, and provide for reexamination if the
Director concludes that the reference presented in the request presents a
SNQ of patentability.349
If he so concludes, then reexamination proceeds primarily according
to the current ex parte reexamination rules, with some differences. The
most important difference is that the current restriction limiting ex parte
reexaminations to consideration of prior art patents and printed publications
is inapplicable in supplemental examinations and “information” is not
limited or defined by the AIA. Supplemental examinations can be based on
346. See Bhattacharyya & McGurk, supra note 84, at 624.
347. 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2012).
348. The PTO has projected that all of the approximately 110 requests it received
annually from patent owners for ex parte reexaminations pre-AIA will be filed as requests
for supplemental examinations post-AIA, and that it will receive approximately 1,430
requests for supplemental examinations annually. See Changes to Implement the
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and to
Revise Reexamination Fees; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48828, 48847-48 (Aug. 14, 2012).
These projections have been disputed. See Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Supplemental
Examination
Final
Rules,
PATENTLY-O
(Aug.
13,
2012,
3:48
PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/supplemental-examination-final-rules.html
(predicting that the actual number would be “much, much smaller” than the PTO’s
projection of 1,430). During the period from September 2012 to December 2013, the PTO
received 59 requests for supplemental examination. See AIA Statistics: Supplemental
Examination,
U.S.
PATENT
AND
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/statistics.jsp (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). Sixteen
of the requests were publicly available as of August 2013 and of those sixteen, fourteen had
been considered by the PTO. The PTO ordered reexaminations and/or found an SNQ in
eleven of the fourteen (approximately seventy-eight percent). Patent claims were rejected in
eight of the eleven, following ex parte reexamination. Eugene T. Perez & Utsav Gupta,
Some Early Statistics for Supplemental Examination, LAW360 (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:32 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/462658/some-early-statistics-for-supplementalexamination. Cost may be one primary factor that is constraining the use of supplemental
examination. See Bhattacharyya & McGurk, supra note 84, at 638 (noting that
supplemental examination “is expected to be very expensive”).
349. 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2011).
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any information believed relevant to the patent. For this reason, a patent
owner may take advantage of supplemental examinations to alert the PTO
to prior art patents and printed publications, as well as non-print prior art
and non-prior art information held by the Federal Circuit to be material in
inequitable conduct cases prior to Therasense.350 This is a much broader
scope of information than the “patent and printed publications” limitation
of ex parte reexamination. A second important difference is that the patent
owner, who filed the request for supplemental examination, is barred from
submitting a statement.351
Supplemental examination is not available if allegations of inequitable
conduct have been “pled with particularity in a civil action.”352 If
defendant alleges in court that certain conduct constitutes inequitable
conduct, the patentee loses the ability to cure the defect through
supplemental examination. But this exception is likely to have very limited
application, because evidence of inequitable conduct is frequently
unavailable until discovery occurs353 and typically the timing of the onset of
litigation is within the patentee’s control. In most cases, patentees can be
expected to exercise such control by filing an absolving request for
supplemental examination prior to taking any action that might trigger a
declaratory judgment action.354 Moreover, the requirement that inequitable
conduct be pled with particularity in order to trigger the exception likely
entails compliance with Exergen. For all of the reasons described supra, it
is very difficult to satisfy Exergen’s pleading standard.
In the absence of the rare exception, supplemental examination will
permit a patentee to effectively inoculate a patent against all but the most
egregious forms of inequitable conduct by resubmitting the patent for
reexamination based on corrected information. Once that corrected
information is considered, the patent cannot later be held unenforceable on
350. Lisa A. Dolak, America Invents the Supplemental Examination, but Retains the
Duty of Candor: Questions and Implications, 6 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 147, 151 (2012).
351. 35 U.S.C. § 257(b) (2012).
352. 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(A) (2012).
353. See Formax Inc. v. Alkar-Rapidpak-MP Equip. Inc., No. 11-C-0298, 2013 WL
2368824, at *6 (E.D. Wis. May 29, 2013) (“Allegations of inequitable conduct are often
based on information uniquely within the possession of the patentee, and often cannot be
brought until after significant discovery has been completed.”).
354. See Tokic, supra note 263, at 262 (“Thus, it appears unlikely the exception will
preclude patent holders from strategically manipulating the supplemental examination rules
to escape inequitable conduct claims.”). There is a second exception, set forth in 35 U.S.C.
§ 257(c)(2)(B) (2012), but it too will be rarely used. It relates to patent infringement actions
under Section 281 of the Patent Act or actions in the ITC for unfair competition or
importation under Section 337(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)). Under
the second exception, the effect of supplemental examination will not apply unless the
examination and any reexamination resulting from it are finished prior to the date on which
the action is brought. 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(B) (2012).
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the basis of conduct relating to such information. This is true even if a
reexamination is not conducted.355 The legislative history of the AIA
indicates that supplemental examination can serve to prevent a patent from
subsequently being held invalid,356 and the PTO has publicly stated that
“[a] patent owner may use supplemental examination to forestall a
subsequent inequitable conduct challenge to the enforceability of the patent
during litigation.”357 This signaling effect alone may be sufficient to ensure
that inoculation occurs.
The proceeding is available only to patent owners,358 who will be able
to cure intentional failures to disclose prior art that would otherwise be
grounds for a finding of inequitable conduct. The AIA requires patentees
to request and conclude supplemental examination before attempting
enforcement.359 Where that occurs, examinations can be used as free passes
by patent owners who deceive the PTO. As such, supplemental
examinations create a patent amnesty program.360 Amnesty is created not
merely for issued patents. It also is created for any other patent that, if it
had been examined in light of information relevant to the patentability of
the claimed invention reasonably available during the initial examination,
might not have been issued or might have been issued in a much narrower
form.361 This differs considerably from pre-AIA post-grant procedures,
wherein the submission of information for consideration by the PTO was
an effective admission of its materiality.362 The Federal Circuit has held
that the submission of information during reexamination does not bar the
subsequent assertion of an inequitable conduct defense based on such
information, and in fact can provide a basis for the defense.363
The overarching effect is that supplemental examination destroys any
incentive for patentees to provide honest disclosure to the PTO during the
patent application process, and thereby significantly undermines one of the
primary goals of the U.S. patent system. Post-grant review is unlikely to
355. LINCK, STONER, BARRETT & SPIEGEL, supra note 293, at 120.
356. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 539 (2012).
357. Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Publishes Final Rules
for Supplemental Examination and Inventor’s Oath or Declaration (Aug. 13, 2012),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2012/12-51.jsp.
358. 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2011).
359. 35 U.S.C. § 257 (2011).
360. Rantanen, Petherbridge & Kesan, supra note 292, at 244 (concluding that
supplemental examinations provide the opportunity “to immunize all but the most egregious
misconduct before a competitor ever has an opportunity to learn of it”).
361. Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 51, at 26-27.
362. 5 Procedures, supra note 306, at 58.
363. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (noting that “inequitable conduct cannot be cured by . . .
reexamination”).
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negate the powerful impact of supplemental examinations, because such
examinations are likely to touch a much broader body of patents.364
Likewise, while the potential impact of the amnesty is blunted because
the Director must make a confidential referral to the U.S. Attorney General
for possible prosecution if the Director becomes aware during the course of
a supplemental examination or related reexamination that material fraud
may have been committed on the PTO,365 this reduction in impact is liable
to be extremely limited. The AIA does not identify the distinctions
between inequitable conduct (which can be corrected) and fraud (which
apparently cannot).366 Subsequent to Therasense, the two are closer than
they have ever been. The Director had the power to encourage prosecution
of those who engage in material misconduct long before the AIA was
enacted, but that power was almost never exercised.367 A 2013 review
concluded that the two most recent prosecutions for dishonesty before the
PTO occurred in 1976 and 1934.368 There is no reason to assume the
situation will change following enactment. Even if the PTO does make a
referral to the Attorney General it still must conclude the supplemental
examination.369 And the “chronically underfunded”370 PTO itself has
shown virtually no interest in regulating patent attorneys who engage in
misconduct. Indeed, it stopped enforcement of the inequitable conduct
doctrine in 1988.371
Finally, insofar as the statute of limitations for the criminal law most
likely applicable (18 U.S.C. § 1001, which establishes liability for false
statements in matters involving the U.S government)372 is five years,373
364. Rantanen, Petherbridge & Kesan, supra note 292, at 245.
365. 35 U.S.C. § 257(e) (2012).
366. Frederick Frei & Sean Wooden, Inequitable Conduct Claims One Year After
Therasense, MANAGING INTELL. PROP.: THE GLOBAL IP RESOURCE (Andrews Kurth, D.C.),
July
18,
2012,
at
5,
available
at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CC4QFjA
A&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.andrewskurth.com%2Fmedia%2Farticle%2F1620_Managin
g%2520IP%2520Article.pdf&ei=63yNUsXpKO3D4AOVvYGwAg&usg=AFQjCNETTfva
Xgmk_lEFDBAp97gMKuc77g&sig2=BaRSyqQK6AbU7aMeZ2IBQ&bvm=bv.56988011,d.dmg&cad=rja.
367. Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 51, at 26.
368. Chiang, supra note 3, at 1297.
369. Matal, supra note 356, at 539.
370. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 813 (2008). However, the PTO’s budget did
approximately double to $3 billion, from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2014. See Dennis
Crouch & Jason Rantanen, USPTO’s Budget to Rise Significantly, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 17,
2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/usptos-budget-to-rise-significantly.html.
371. See Chiang, supra note 3, at 1271 (explaining that the PTO has not conducted
inequitable conduct investigations for more than twenty years).
372. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) (2012) makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully falsify,
conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme or device a material fact in any matter within the
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measured from the date each element of the crime has occurred,374
prosecution for most material misconduct would be time-barred by the time
a patent is scrutinized in a supplemental examination or ex parte
reexamination. In fiscal year 2012, it took an average of 32.4 months for a
patent application to issue as a patent or be abandoned, even longer than
the 32.2 months it took in fiscal year 2009.375 Given this almost three-year
lag, which shows no major signs of improvement,376 it is likely that
supplemental examinations will not be requested, and fraud will not be
discovered, until after five years has elapsed.377
Supplemental examinations are overtly designed to reduce patentees’
exposure to inequitable conduct claims,378 unnecessarily replicate the effect
of Therasense,379 and thereby threaten to make the inequitable conduct
defense a historic relic.380 The overall outcome is likely to be more fraud
before the PTO,381 accompanied by a net increase in the cost of
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the federal government.
373. The applicable five-year statute of limitations is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)
(2012). See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1984).
374. See United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1984) (outlining when the
statute of limitations begins to run). Accord United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 586 (6th
Cir. 1998).
375. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal
Year 2012, supra note 76, at 14.
376. The fiscal year 2012 average total pendency of 32.2 months did reflect a decline
from the 33.7 months in fiscal year 2011 and also bettered the PTO’s fiscal year 2012 target
of 34.7 months. See id.
377. Chiang, supra note 3, at 1297 (“Because it is unlikely that fraud on the PTO will be
discovered in five years—and patentees can virtually ensure this by waiting six years before
doing anything with their patent—there is little credible deterrence from criminal
prosecution.”); White, supra note 3, at 731.
378. Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 638 (2012). But cf. Angie
M. Hankins, Iuliana Tanase & Reiko Manabe, Is Inequitable Conduct Still a Viable
Defense?, LAW 360
(Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/285249/isinequitable-conduct-still-a-viable-defense (“[S]upplemental examination appears to be
directed toward close calls or error, rather than permitting the curing of intentional and
egregious misconduct before the PTO.”).
379. See Kelly, supra note 220 at *3 (observing that the incentive to use supplemental
examination “seems greatly diminished” after Therasense); Kevin B. Laurence & Matthew
C. Phillips, Supplemental Examination and the Proposed Rules, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
TODAY 7, 8 (Mar. 2012) (“Therasense significantly diminished the need for supplemental
examination . . . .”).
380. See Peter E. Strand, Disarming an ‘Atomic Bomb’: Federal Circuit Clips Wires for
Inequitable Conduct, 24 No. 8 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 20, 22 (2012) (concluding that
supplemental examinations may make the inequitable conduct defense “a dinosaur”).
381. See Maurice Ross, A Year of Dramatic Change in Intellectual Property Law: Who
are the Winners and Losers?, ASPATORE, 2013 WL 571327, at *8 (Jan. 2013) (“This new
‘get out of jail free’ law, together with recent Federal Circuit jurisprudence making it almost
impossible to prove inequitable conduct, conveys exactly the wrong message and provides
perverse incentives for cheating and fraud.”); accord Priscilla G. Taylor, Bringing Equity
Back to the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine?, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 349, 372 (2012)
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competition, higher barriers to market entry, decreased innovation, lowerquality patents, and a decline in the economic competitiveness of the
U.S.382
In summary, the AIA’s new provisions for supplemental examination
and post-grant review, together with its modification of inter partes review,
will substantially constrict the inequitable conduct defense.
B. Best Mode
Similar to the AIA’s post-issuance review provisions, the AIA’s new
best mode provision also will operate to constrain the use of the inequitable
conduct defense. At least since the 1800s U.S. patent law has required an
inventor to disclose the best mode associated with application of the
principle of her invention.383 This best mode requirement has applied to all
classes of inventions beginning with the 1952 Patent Act,384 which in 35
U.S.C. § 112 requires the inventor seeking a patent to disclose the “best
mode . . . of carrying out her invention.”385 The requirement does not
require actual disclosure of the best mode, but instead only adequate
disclosure to enable someone of ordinary skill in the art to practice the best
mode without undue experimentation.386 Under the 1952 Patent Act the
failure to disclose best mode during patent prosecution could result in
rejection by the patent examiner.387
Determining compliance with the best mode requirement is a twoprong fact-based inquiry. First, it must be determined whether, at the time
(concluding that supplemental examinations could lead to increased incidence of inequitable
conduct before the PTO).
382. See, e.g., Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 51, at 31 (noting that AIA “presents
a very real risk of increasing the number of low-quality patents”).
383. The Patent Act of 1836 required a patent applicant to explain the principle of her
invention and the “several modes” associated with application of that principle, as
contemplated by the inventor. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1870).
The Patent Act of 1870 required a patent applicant to explain the principle of her invention
and the best mode associated with application of that principle, as contemplated by the
inventor, but this requirement applied only to machine patents. Patent Act of July 8, 1870,
ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, amended by Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792
(1952).
384. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 112, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2006)).
385. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
386. Joy MM Delaware, Inc. v. Cincinnati Mine Mach., Co., 497 F. App’x 970 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); Ajinomoto Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 597 F.3d 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Routine details apparent to someone of ordinary skill in the art need not be disclosed to
satisfy the best mode requirement. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release
Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
387. Ryan G. Vacca, Patent Reform and Best Mode: A Signal to the Patent Office or a
Step Toward Elimination?, 75 ALB. L. REV. 279, 293 (2012).
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the patent application was filed, the inventor possessed a best mode for
practicing the invention. This is a subjective inquiry388 that focuses on the
inventor’s state of mind at the time of filing. Second, if the inventor did
possess a best mode, it must be determined whether the written description
disclosed the mode such that a person skilled in the art could practice it.
This is an objective inquiry that focuses on the scope of the claimed
invention and the level of skill in the art.389
There is some confusion as to whether invalidation based on a best
mode violation requires that the inventor knew of and intentionally
concealed a better mode than was disclosed. The Federal Circuit has not
always been clear about this issue. In some cases it seems to have required
concealment,390 but in other cases it has stated that intent to conceal is not
an element.391 In still other cases, the court has explained that it uses the
term “concealment” as a shorthand way of inquiring about the adequacy of
the disclosure.392 Section 112 does not on its face impose a concealment
requirement.393
Failure to disclose the best mode has furnished grounds for rejecting
patent applications in the PTO and, more commonly, for declaring the

388. Anvik Corp. v. Nikon Precision, Inc., 519 F. App’x 1019, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
389. Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Responsive Innovations, LLC v. Holtzbrinck Publishers, LLC, 911 F. Supp. 2d 526, 537
(N.D. Ohio 2012).
390. See Ateliers de la Haute-Garonne v. Broetje Automation USA Inc., 717 F.3d 1351,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Violation requires intentional concealment; innocent or inadvertent
failure of disclosure does not of itself invalidate the patent.”); Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman
Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“‘Invalidation based on a best mode
violation requires that the inventor knew of and intentionally concealed a better mode than
was disclosed.’”) (citing High Concrete Structures, Inc. v. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co.,
377 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
391. See In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig.,
676 F.3d 1063, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that an examination of intent to conceal is
inconsistent with an objective inquiry). See also Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., No.
10-CV-2618-H (KSDC), 2012 WL 6863471, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (“The Court
agrees with the Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride opinion. Therefore, Apple and LG do not
need to present evidence showing that the inventors intentionally concealed the better
mode.”).
392. See In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig.,
676 F.3d at 1085-86 (discussing use of the term “concealment” to describe a test of the
adequacy of disclosure); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1215-16
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A best mode violation may occur if the disclosure of the best mode is so
objectively inadequate as to effectively conceal the best mode from the public.”) (emphasis
in original); see also Jason Rantanen, Best Mode: Only Mostly Dead, PATENTLY-O (May 27,
2013; 11:53 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/best-mode-only-mostlydead.html (predicting that the Federal Circuit split “will likely remain forever unresolved”).
393. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (illustrating that section 112 does not mention a
concealment requirement).
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patents invalid or unenforceable in subsequent litigation.394 Invalidity for
failure to satisfy the best mode requirement must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence,395 and compliance with the requirement is both a
question of fact396 and often highly factual.397 The Federal Circuit reviews
findings of best mode disclosure violations for clear error.398
The best mode requirement has several related justifications. The first
justification is to ensure that the public is placed on a level playing field
with the patentee upon expiration of the patent.399 The second is to
compensate the public for the cost of the monopoly created by a patent.400
A third is to realize basic notions of fairness.401
Best mode has endured in the U.S. despite being subject to criticism
on several grounds. First, best mode has failed to level the field because it
is subjective—only the best mode contemplated by the inventor must be
394. Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, The Pseudo-Elimination of Best Mode: Worst
Possible Choice?, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 170, 171 (2012) (noting that pre-AIA,
courts were required to declare patents invalid where applicants knew of best mode and
failed to disclose it); Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2012) (noting that “the primary means of enforcing best mode was
in litigation”).
395. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676
F.3d at 1087; AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1240
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
396. Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
397. See Anvik Corp. v. Nikon Precision, Inc., 519 F. App’x 1019, 1021 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (“The question whether the best mode requirement has been satisfied is highly
factual.”).
398. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676
F.3d at 1084; Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
399. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292, 1302 n.8 (7th Cir.
1989) (“[T]he best mode requirement is intended to allow the public to compete fairly with
the patentee following the expiration of the patents.”); see also Joy MM Del., Inc. v.
Cincinnati Mine Mach., Co., 497 F. App’x 970, 974 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“At its heart, the
best mode requirement is concerned with preventing inventors from concealing the best
mode of their inventions while being rewarded with the right to exclude others from making
or using it.”); Chisum, supra note 33, at 280 (“The purpose of the best mode requirement is
to prevent inventors from obtaining patent protection while concealing from the public the
preferred embodiments of their inventions.”).
400. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The best
mode requirement creates a statutory bargained-for-exchange by which a patentee obtains
the right to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention for a certain time period,
and the public receives knowledge of the preferred embodiments for practicing the claimed
invention.”); Matthew H. Solomson, Patently Confusing: The Federal Circuit’s Inconsistent
Treatment of Claim Scope as a Limit on the Best Mode Disclosure Requirement, 45 IDEA
383, 384 (2005) (“The purpose of the statutory disclosure requirements, in general, and the
best mode requirement, in particular, is to compensate the public for the cost of the
monopoly conferred on a patentee.”); cf. Petherbridge & Rantanen, supra note 274, at 126
(describing the policy purpose of the best mode requirement as “something of an enigma”).
401. Wesley D. Markham, Is Best Mode the Worst?: Dueling Arguments, Empirical
Analysis, and Recommendations for Reform, 51 IDEA 129, 131 (2011).
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disclosed, even if the best mode, in an objective sense, is not revealed to
the public.402 Second, best mode also fails to meet its goal because the
rapid pace of technological change may negate the best mode before the
patent term ends. Third, best mode increases litigation costs403 while
providing modest benefits, and, because the rule is virtually unique to the
U.S.,404 it places at a disadvantage foreign applicants who apply for patents
in their home countries and then must amend their U.S. applications to
comply with the best mode requirement.405 Finally, it has been argued that
the courts have applied the best mode requirement inconsistently.406
Most of the foregoing points can be rebutted. First, while best mode is
subjective, the inventor’s subjective intent may be proven by inference
from objective evidence, such as performance data for various
embodiments of the invention.407 Second, there is little or no evidence
definitively linking best mode to an increase in patent litigation costs,408
and the AIA’s abolition of failure to disclose best mode as a basis for
finding invalidity or unenforceability will result in only modest savings and
may even increase costs, because the volume of discovery is not expected
to decline.409 Third, the notion that best mode is unique to the U.S. is
untrue. According to one survey, by 2005 at least twenty-four countries
required best mode disclosure,410 and the global trend has reflected

402. Vacca, supra note 387, at 288.
403. Before the AIA was enacted, members of Congress and testifying witnesses
repeatedly complained about the high cost associated with best mode determinations. See
Matal, supra note 356, at 582.
404. Chisum, supra note 33, at 279; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose
Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 553 (2012) (noting that best mode is not
imposed in Europe).
405. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 121 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10976 (noting that only the U.S. has a best
mode requirement and characterizing it as an “unusual additional requirement”);
Petherbridge & Rantanen, supra note 394, at 171 (“Perhaps the most common argument for
eliminating best mode was that it disadvantaged foreign inventors.”).
406. See Solomson, supra note 400, at 420 (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s best mode
decisions cannot be explained by a consistent set of principles.”); Steven B. Walmsley, Best
Mode: A Plea to Repair or Sacrifice this Broken Requirement of United States Patent Law,
9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 125, 153 (2002) (criticizing best mode on basis that
courts have used seven different standards for assessing the disclosure required to comply
with the obligation).
407. Love & Seaman, supra note 394, at 19.
408. Markham, supra note 401, at 142-43 (noting that the hypothesized incremental cost
of best mode cannot be disentangled from other variables that affect the same cost).
409. Love & Seaman, supra note 394, at 16.
410. Andrew R. Shores, Comment, Changes to the Best Mode Requirement in the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Why Congress Got it Right, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 733,
745 (2012).
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adoption.411
The AIA did not substantively change the best mode requirement
(except insofar as the requirement now encompasses the best mode
contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor). Amended Section 35
U.S.C. § 112 still requires patent applicants to disclose a best mode if they
know of one.412 However, courts will no longer enforce this requirement,
insofar as the AIA amended 35 U.S.C. § 282 to eliminate failure to disclose
the best mode as a ground for asserting invalidity of the patent,
unenforceability, or cancellation of any or all claims in a patent.413 Thus,
under the AIA, patent applicants must disclose the best mode to receive a
patent, but if a patent is obtained despite a failure to so disclose, no
challenge to the patent rights can be made based on such a failure. The
prohibition on invalidating a patent claim for failure to disclose best mode
encompasses ex parte reexamination and post-grant review. The foregoing
mixed outcome appears to represent a compromise between critics of best
mode who wanted to abolish it entirely and proponents who wanted to
preserve it in some fashion.414
Prior to adoption of the AIA intentional best mode violations could be
deemed inequitable conduct.415 It is not entirely clear whether inequitable
conduct based on intentional concealment of the best mode remains a
viable defense in civil litigation post-AIA. Nothing in the statute explicitly
excludes such a defense. The AIA only excludes failure to disclose the
best mode as a direct basis for invalidity or unenforceability, but
defendants generally did not assert such a failure in pre-AIA litigation.
411. Dale L. Carlson, Katarzyna Przychodzen & Petra Scamborova, Patent Linchpin for
the 21st Century?—Best Mode Revisited, 45 IDEA 267, 283-85 (2005). The authors refer to
the assertion that only the U.S. imposes a best mode requirement as a “common
misconception.” Id. at 281.
412. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 4.
413. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A) (2012). This amendment was not given retroactive effect
for cases that were filed before the America Invents Act was enacted. Anvik Corp. v. Nikon
Precision, Inc., 519 F. App’x 1019, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
414. Love & Seaman, supra note 394, at 8. Cf. Matal, supra note 356, at 584 (“The
legislative history provides no explanation for Congress’s failure to simply repeal the bestmode requirement entirely. Nor is one apparent.”).
415. See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 808 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (holding that failure to disclose best mode is inherently material and “reaches the
minimum level of materiality necessary for a finding of inequitable conduct”); Chisum,
supra note 33, at 281 (“If a best mode violation is intentional, it can be deemed inequitable
conduct, resulting in unenforceability of the entire patent and other adverse
consequences . . . .”); see also Responsive Innovations, LLC v. Holtzbrinck Publishers,
LLC, 911 F. Supp. 2d 526, 544 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (noting that the failure to disclose best
mode will not constitute inequitable conduct in every case); Old Town Canoe Co. v.
Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (confirming that failure
to disclose best mode is inherently material, but finding no intent to deceive PTO and
therefore no inequitable conduct).
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Rather, they asserted inequitable conduct before the PTO as the direct basis
for a finding of unenforceability. However, the foregoing distinction is
unlikely to prevail, because the AIA does not distinguish between direct
and indirect bases for validity and unenforceability. Congress, when it
enacted the AIA, was aware that best mode violations were frequently
styled as inequitable conduct claims, and this probably explains why the
AIA excludes failure to disclose the best mode as a basis for both invalidity
and unenforceability.416 The failure to disclose best mode almost certainly
has been eliminated as a direct and indirect basis for asserting invalidity or
unenforceability.417
Prior to enactment of the AIA, best mode was not a primary defense
and it was rarely successful.418 Now it has been eliminated as a defense
altogether. While the best mode requirement has been nominally retained,
it has been rendered a virtual nullity in any proceeding in which the issue
of compliance with the requirement might arise.419
It has been suggested that best mode retains some utility under the
AIA, for a couple of reasons. First, even if evidence supporting the defense
has become inadmissible at trial, a patent applicant’s knowledge of a best
mode may be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence relevant to a claim of inequitable conduct or unclean hands.420
Second, if discovery reveals an undisclosed best mode, the doctrine of
416. Vacca, supra note 387, at 293 & n.108.
417. See Petherbridge & Rantanen, supra note 274, at 126-27 (concluding that the AIA
“has, as a practical matter, effectively eliminated the best mode requirement from patent
law”). But cf. Harkins, supra note 69, at *10 (“At least theoretically . . . if a defendant can
show that the patent applicant intentionally withheld the best mode, that may constitute
inequitable conduct. It remains to be seen how courts will handle that argument, since
failing to disclose best mode is not a typical fraud on the USPTO.”); Markham, supra note
401, at 156 (“In effect, eliminating best mode as a defense in patent litigation would fold
any best mode related issues that arise into a court’s general inequitable conduct analysis.”);
Jayson Singh Sohi, Comment, Changes to the Best Mode Requirement: Weakening
Enforcement Undermines the Purpose of Patent Law and Exacerbates an Ethical Patent
Trilemma, 17 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 157, 168 (2013) (arguing that the only likely means of
redress for post-AIA violations of the best mode requirement “will have to come in the form
of an inequitable conduct inquiry”).
418. See Bayer A.G. v. Schein Pharms., 301 F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“In the
history of this court and our predecessor courts we have held claims invalid for failure to
satisfy the best mode requirement on only seven occasions.”); Kelly, supra note 220 at *3
(“[F]ew patents over the past twenty years [prior to 2012] have been invalidated on best
mode grounds.”); Markham, supra note 401, at 149-52 (concluding that (a) the best mode
defense succeeded in district court only eighteen percent of the time during the period 20052009; (b) the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that there was a best mode
violation only once during the period 2002-2009; and (c) the BPAI never affirmed in a
published decision an examiner’s best mode rejection during the period 1981-2009).
419. Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and its Implications
for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 87-93 (2012).
420. Love & Seaman, supra note 394, at 21.
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unclean hands may provide a remedy.421 As to the first point, however, the
combination of Exergen, Therasense, and the AIA’s new post-issuance
proceedings has essentially eviscerated the inequitable conduct defense.
As to the second point, the doctrine of unclean hands has never been an
effective substitute for inequitable conduct for the reasons discussed supra.
As noted, a party who is foreign to the alleged unclean conduct at the time
of its occurrence generally cannot raise a claim of unclean hands. And
whereas application of the inequitable conduct doctrine results in the
unenforceability of the entire patent, the unclean hands defense merely
allows courts to dismiss complaints filed by plaintiffs suing in bad faith.
The AIA’s revision of best mode may create an incentive for inventors
to actively conceal the best mode,422 as long as the risk of detection by the
PTO is sufficiently low. In fact, the risk of detection by the PTO is
virtually nonexistent, because the patent examiner will almost never have
evidence sufficient to permit her to conclude that the inventor, at the time
of filing the application, knew of a better mode of practicing the claimed
invention.423 The PTO acknowledges this point in the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure.424
The effective elimination of best mode and its concomitant
constriction of the inequitable conduct defense undermine the quid pro quo
basis of patent law, which is that the patent applicant should play fair and
square with the patent system. It is unfair if the applicant can receive from
the public the right to exclude, while at the same time maintaining part of
the invention as a trade secret by concealing from the public the preferred
embodiment of the invention.425 Prior to the AIA, best mode also played a
critical role in establishing the level of inventiveness necessary for a patent
421. Id.
422. John Villasenor, The Comprehensive Patent Reform of 2011: Navigating the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 184 BROOKINGS POLICY BRIEF 1, 4 (Sept. 2011),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/9/patents%20villasenor/09_p
atents_villasenor.pdf.
423. Shores, supra note 411, at 738-39 (“[T]he PTO’s current examination procedures
make enforcement of the best mode requirement during the examination virtually
impossible.”); Vacca, supra note 387, at 294.
424. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2165.03 (8th ed. 2001, 9th rev.
2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-2100.pdf (“The
information that is necessary to form the basis for a rejection based on the failure to set forth
the best mode is rarely accessible to the examiner . . . .”).
425. Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“The purpose of the best mode requirement is to restrain inventors from applying for a
patent while at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments of their
inventions which they have in fact conceived.”) (emphasis in original); Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The best mode
requirement thus is intended to ensure that a patent applicant plays ‘fair and square’ with the
patent system. It is a requirement that the quid pro quo of the patent grant be satisfied.”).

428

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:2

to issue. As explained by Professors Petherbridge and Rantanen, “the best
mode requirement cooperates with nonobviousness doctrine to protect the
balance between incentive and access in the patent system.”426 The
effective elimination of the best mode requirement terminates that
protection. In short, the AIA limits the inequitable conduct defense at
cross-purposes with fundamental objectives of the U.S. patent system.
CONCLUSION
Through a combination of judicial and political action, Therasense
and the AIA have unduly narrowed the inequitable conduct defense. The
Federal Circuit limited the defense explicitly and in substance by restricting
its elements and establishing a more lenient disclosure obligation.
Congress constrained the defense implicitly and largely through
procedures. The AIA removed best mode violations as a basis for asserting
inequitable conduct, and it established provisions for post-issuance review
that provide patentees with a safe harbor from allegations of inequitable
conduct. The restrictions imposed collectively by Therasense and the AIA
will tend to undermine fundamental objectives of patent law. At a
minimum, the undue contraction of the inequitable conduct defense will
substantially reduce the incentive for patent applicants to make full and
early disclosure to the overall detriment of the U.S. patent system. At the
same time, Therasense will operate to substantially reduce the opportunity
for parties to assert Walker Process antitrust claims. Overall, the cure has
been worse than the plague.

426. Petherbridge & Rantanen, supra note 274, at 129.

